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Autonomy, Debate, and Corporate Speech
By DAVID SHELLEDY*
By one estimate, corporations spend a billion dollars each year to
run political editorials in newspapers, magazines, the broadcast media,
and direct mail campaigns.' Mobil Oil has made itself a familiar example
by spending an estimated $3.5 million annually on political advertise-
ments.' Its views on public issues occupy a quarter of the New York
Times' Op Ed page every 14 days, making Mobil one of the loudest
voices in national discourse. Other examples may be less familiar, like
the collection of smaller companies that jointly purchased a full page of
the Times on the eve of Operation Desert Storm to advocate continuation
of economic sanctions, avoidance of "an unnecessary war," and develop-
ment of a national energy policy based on conservation and alternative
fuels.' Every Sunday morning, big business corporations tell the nation
their views on farm, energy, and trade policy in advertisements on the
weekly network news programs; and every month, inserts in utility bill-
ing envelopes bring corporate opinions on conservation, nuclear power,
or the latest regulatory proposal pending before some state or federal
commission.
Legislatures and regulatory bodies have responded to this unprece-
dented level of corporate political advocacy by adopting a variety of re-
strictions. The restrictions, in turn, have provoked numerous
constitutional challenges by business corporations seeking to maintain
some influence in American politics. Their claims for first amendment
protection reached the Supreme Court over a decade ago. In this period
of changing membership and steadfast dissent, however, the more corpo-
rate speech cases the Supreme Court decides, the more unsettled first
amendment doctrine becomes.
* Harry A. Bigelow Teaching Fellow and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago. On
brief in FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990), discussed in foot-
notes 23 and 24. I am grateful to Bruce Ackerman, Jerome Barron, Owen Fiss, Mary French,
and Don Judges for inspiration and valuable comments on earlier drafts.
1. T. EDSALL, THE NEW POLITICS OF INEQUALITY 116 (1984) (citing 1978 Congres-
sional Committee estimate). As Edsall takes care to note, such estimates are necessarily gross,
because most spending for editorial advertisements need not be disclosed.
2. Id.
3. N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1990, at 5 (national ed.).
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In its first effort, First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,4 the Court
established one lasting principle: If corporate speech enriches public de-
bate, there is reason to protect it regardless of whether corporations have
any constitutional interest in speaking that is independent of the interests
of a public audience in receiving corporate communications.5 This prin-
ciple tells us little of significance, though, unless we know whether corpo-
rate speech enriches or impoverishes public debate.
The Court has equivocated on that issue. In Bellotti, the Court as-
sumed that corporate speech enriches public debate. The Court reached
the opposite conclusion more recently, however, when it found that cor-
porate speech threatens to distort public discourse and corrupt the demo-
cratic process in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.I Decided by
a new majority composed mostly of Bellotti dissenters,7 Austin shows
that important parts of the Court's earlier thinking about corporate
speech fail to command the support of a majority of the Justices.
The Court's unwillingness to rule on whether corporations have in-
terests as speakers that should be protected even if their speech impover-
ishes public debate has created another area of uncertainty. Although
the Court declined to address the issue explicitly in Bellotti, speaker au-
tonomy interests appear to have influenced the decision in that case. In
addition, the private interests of corporate speakers appear to have con-
trolled the decision of a fractured Court in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
Public Utilities Commission.' Again, however, the most recent decision
of a new majority in Austin suggests that the Court's views are changing.
Two competing free speech ideals account for some of the contradic-
tions and inconsistencies among the Supreme Court's first amendment
decisions. This Article examines how each of those ideals may be applied
or misapplied when invoked by corporations. Part V9 identifies speaker
autonomy and rich public debate as distinct normative bases for protect-
ing freedom of speech and discusses the Supreme Court's ambivalence
toward them. Both ideals have influenced the Court's decisions, usually
4. 435 U.S. 765 (1978); see infra notes 80-93 and accompanying text.
5. As used in this article, an "audience-independent" interest in speaking is an interest in
speaking that does not depend on the interests of the speaker's audience in receiving the
communication.
6. 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990); see infra notes 120-142 and accompanying text.
7. Justices Rehnquist, Brennan, Marshall, and White dissented from the Court's decision
in Bellotti. Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined the Bellotti dissenters to form the new ma-
jority in Austin. For the remainder of this article, current Chief Justice Rehnquist will be
referred to by his title at the time of a particular decision. Thus, in Bellotti, he was a Justice,
not the Chief Justice.
8. 475 U.S. 1 (1986); see infra notes 94-118 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 25-79 and accompanying text.
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converging on the protection of speech; but neither ideal has consistently
prevailed in hard cases where the two conflict.
The effects of this ambivalence have been particularly profound in
cases involving corporate speech. Parts II and III focus on conflicts be-
tween autonomy and debate in those cases. Bellotti and Pacific Gas re-
flect the declining importance of rich public debate, and the ascendance
of autonomy as the paramount ideal.10 As the new decade opens, how-
ever, Austin suggests a renewed commitment to the ideal of rich public
debate and uncertainty that corporate speech implicates the ideal of
speaker autonomy in any way."1
Part IV considers how recognition of corporate speech rights actu-
ally affects public debate and speaker autonomy. Part IV.A E shows that
corporate speech can either enrich or impoverish public debate. Corpo-
rate speech can enrich debate because the views expressed on behalf of
corporations may differ from the personal views expressed by corporate
managers,13 the process of formulating corporate views for publication
may influence the personal views corporate managers hold and express, 4
and corporate participation in public discourse may reduce the domi-
nance of government and the institutional press.1"
The richness of public debate is not solely a function of what is said,
however, it depends also on what is effectively heard. From this perspec-
tive, corporate speech may sometimes impoverish public debate. Few
individuals can afford to use mass media as effectively as corporations.
Concentrated wealth may therefore enable corporations to reduce the
likelihood that a significant audience will hear the competing voices of
individuals who lack privileged positions in government and media. 6
Because corporate speech can either enrich or impoverish public dis-
course, the ideal of rich debate not only supports careful judicial scrutiny
of measures restricting corporate speech but also provides a compelling
justification for some such restrictions.
An independent corporate interest in speech autonomy, the freedom
to speak or refrain from speaking without forcing or interference by
others, might condemn restrictions on corporate speech even when those
restrictions foster public debate. Part IV.B17 explains that the ideal of
10. See infra notes 80-118 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 119-42 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 147-73 and accompanying text.
13. Infra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
14. Infra note 149 and accompanying text.
15. Infra notes 155-63 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 164-70 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 174-204 and accompanying text.
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speaker autonomy does not support corporate speech rights, because cor-
porations cannot speak autonomously and lack the dignity of an autono-
mous agent."8 The ideal of speaker autonomy rests on respect for
independence in matters of conscience, a concern corporate autonomy
cannot implicate because corporations lack consciousness and, hence,
have no independent conscience to protect. Moreover, corporations are
created as instruments for the satisfaction of people's desires. As long as
people permit them to exist, corporations remain dependent on others to
decide whether to speak and what to say. For these reasons, corpora-
tions lack autonomy interests worthy of first amendment protection.
While the autonomy interests of corporate constituents are worthy of
consideration, restrictions on corporate speech do not intrude signifi-
cantly on them19
Thus, corporate speech is normatively simpler but factually more
complex than the Court has made it. The ideals of speaker autonomy
and public debate do not conflict in these cases, as the Court's decisions
suggest, because corporate speech does not implicate significant auton-
omy interests. The Court should, therefore, recognize that first amend-
ment concern for corporate speech depends solely on the ideal of rich
public debate. It should also recognize that corporate speech affects pub-
lic debate in many ways, some with potential to enrich and some with
potential to impoverish. Condemning those that enrich and tolerating
those that impoverish on the basis of overbroad assumptions are both
unacceptable alternatives. Only situation-specific analysis of how partic-
ular restrictions on corporate speech affect particular circumstances of
public debate offers a doctrine of corporate speech consistent with first
amendment values.
Before addressing the arguments for this position in detail, some
narrowing of the subject is necessary. As the examples given at the be-
ginning of this Article only begin to suggest, corporate speech has many
variables, including the size of the firm and the purposes for which peo-
ple formed it as well as the nature of the communication and the pur-
poses for which a corporation would express its views. Editorial
advertisements by large business corporations on subjects commonly re-
garded as public and political are the paradigm of corporate speech con-
sidered in this Article, because this is the class of corporate speech that
has generated the most controversy and confusion.
When the nature and purpose of a corporation differ radically from
this paradigm, as in the case of incorporated advocacy associations like
18. See infra notes 185-96 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 197-204 and accompanying text.
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the NAACP, a different analysis is appropriate. While there is no reason
to believe that the speech of large business corporations reflects the per-
sonal views of individual shareholders, incorporated advocacy organiza-
tions are formed for the very purpose of voicing the views of associated
individuals. Thus, unlike ordinary corporate speech, the speech of advo-
cacy organizations implicates the ideal of speaker autonomy in a way
that ordinary corporate speech does not.20 The Supreme Court's sensi-
tivity to the special case of advocacy associations, still being refined,2'
has kept the emerging doctrine of corporate speech from doing harm in
some cases outside the paradigm.
Other cases outside the paradigm have not been resolved satisfacto-
rily. Distinguishing between political and commercial speech, or even
between political speech and commercial action, may not be tenable now
that some corporations are formed for the purpose of conducting busi-
ness in a way that expresses the social convictions of individual share-
holders.22 The recent reversal of first amendment protection for political
boycotts23 shows insensitivity to the political-communicative aspects of
commercial action and suggests that the Court will treat the realms of
commerce and politics as distinct, even when they are not.24
Although these complex issues will eventually arise in corporate
speech cases, they do not arise from the fact that speech or communica-
tive action emanates from a corporate source, and therefore must be left
for another day. This Article focuses on business corporations' explicit
20. See infra notes 134-39 and 197-99 and accompanying text.
21. Id.
22. See, eg., Putting Your Money Where Your Conscience Is, BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 24,
1990, at 74.
23. In FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990), the Supreme
Court found a per se violation of the Sherman Act in an agreement among lawyers to decline
future appointments to represent indigent criminal defendants until the city council passed
legislation increasing the statutory rate of compensation. The Court reversed a decision of the
D.C. Circuit that recognized that boycotts have been employed since colonial times as a means
of dramatic political expression, and held that the First Amendment protects boycotts under-
taken for political-communicative purposes, unless the government can show that the boycot-
ters have sufficient market power to exercise economic coercion. FTC v. Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Ass'n, 865 F.2d 226, 248-50 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990).
24. In Trial Lawyers, the Supreme Court refused to recognize any significant communica-
tive or political component in a boycott that focused public attention on the adequacy of indi-
gent criminal defense representation, because the boycotters stood to profit from the boycott's
success. Id. at 776-78. In essence, the Court treated the realms of commerce and politics as
mutually exclusive: if the boycotters had a financial interest in success, the boycott could not
be a matter of first amendment concern. Justice Brennan, by contrast, found that the boycot-
ters' commercial interests (they sacrificed income by refusing appointments) made their action
communicate a depth of commitment words alone could not express. Id at 789-90 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
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editorializing and advocacy on issues whose political character no one
could deny.
1. Speaker Autonomy and Public Debate as Separate Ideals in
Free Speech Jurisprudence
After two hundred years, no consensus has emerged on what the
First Amendment means by "freedom of speech," not even to the extent
of identifying whose interests the speech clause is meant to protect.25
The Meiklejohn tradition, which dominated first amendment thinking in
the courts and the academy for many years, defends free speech as an
instrument for making collective self-governance possible.26 In this view,
the autonomy of speakers is protected not for any intrinsic or private
value it might have, but because the public needs an uninhibited flow of
information and advocacy reflecting a variety of viewpoints in order to
make informed decisions. Zealous protection of speaker autonomy is
supposed to foster a discourse robust and wide-open enough to satisfy the
informational needs of the public.
Speech protected under the traditional view as facilitating collective
self-governance need not be limited, as in Robert Bork's initial version, to
explicitly political speech concerning governmental behavior, policies, or
personnel.27 Meiklejohn himself thought instrumental protection should
extend more broadly to embrace other forms of expression from which
voters derive knowledge, intelligence, and sensitivity to human values.28
In this broad form, the Meiklejohn theory encompasses much of the
25. The First Amendment states only that "Congress shall make no law.. .abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press. .. ." U.S. Const amend. I.
26. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26-27,
63-65, 88-89 (1948); see also Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT.
REV. 245. Harry Kalven, Jr., Alexander Bickel, Robert Bork, and John Hart Ely are also
identified with this tradition. See BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 62 (1975); Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); J. ELY, DE-
MOCRACY AND DIsTRusT 93-94 (1980); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The
Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. Cr. REv. 191. Recent works by Owen
Fiss are part of the tradition, in that they embrace collective self-governance as the normative
foundation for freedom of speech, but are also critical of the tradition for failure to fulfill its
promise. See Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987); Fiss, Free Speech and
Social Structure, 71 IowA L. REV. 1405 (1986).
27. Bork, supra note 26, at 27. Although Bork continues to maintain that his earlier
position is theoretically sound, he recently abandoned it as too easily manipulable to encom-
pass any and all speech. R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 333 (1990); cf BeVier, The
First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle,
30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978) (legitimate first amendment principle protects only speech that
"participates" in representative democracy).
28. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, supra note at 26; cf Kalven, supra
note 26, at 221 (extending theory to "matters in the public domain").
rVol. 18:541
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value John Milton and John Stuart Mill saw in speech as an instrument
for the discovery of truth,2 9 incorporated in the early concurring and
dissenting opinions of Justices Brandeis and Holmes.3 '
Whether given broad scope or narrow, the Meiklejohn tradition pro-
tects speakers solely because their speech has instrumental value.31
Traditional theorists generally assume that protecting the autonomy of
speakers will foster a rich debate providing the public with needed infor-
mation. Where that assumption proves false, however, the Meildejohn
tradition's consequentialist justification provides little reason to protect
speaker autonomy.32 The First Amendment may even require govern-
mental intervention to foster public debate.3 3
Meiklejohn's followers have viewed the Speech Clause as a servant
of democracy, in part because the Constitution is primarily concerned
with establishing a structure of government.34 Despite the fact that a
government was fully constituted before adoption of the Bill of Rights,
this view reflects an important aspect of the First Amendment. Inclusion
of the right to petition for a redress of grievances makes clear that the
First Amendment is concerned at least partly with the role of citizens in
the structure of government, as Meiklejohn and his followers assert.
Arguing that the Speech Clause is concerned solely with the role of
citizens in the structure of government is more problematic. Protection
of the free exercise of religion in the same sentence as freedom of speech
casts doubt on the proposition that constituting a government is all the
First Amendment was meant to do.35 As this suggests, the Meiklejohn
tradition's exclusive focus on audience as the normative foundation for
freedom of speech cannot adequately account for the breadth of values
29. See MILL, ON LIBERTY 18 (D. Spitz, ed. 1975); MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 58 (R. Jebb,
ed. 1918); cf Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 31-32 (1946). For discussion
of the thought of Milton and Mill, and their contribution to first amendment jurisprudence, see
R. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 92-99 (1985).
30. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
3 1. As Meiklejohn put it: "The First Amendment does not protect a 'freedom to speak.'
It protects the freedom of those activities of thought and communication by which we 'gov-
ern.' " Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, supra note 26, at 255.
32. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 627-30 (1970).
33. Barron, Access to the Press--A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1641
(1967); Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 26, at 786; Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure,
supra note 26, at 1414-15.
34. J. ELY, supra note 26, at 93-94; BeVier, supra note 27, at 308-09; Fiss, Why the State?,
supra note 26.
35. Thus, while Ely reads the Free Speech Clause as a representation-reinforcing provi-
sion, J. ELY, supra note 26, at 93-94, 105-16, he must acknowledge that the Religion Clauses
do not fit well with his theory. Id. at 94.
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promoted by the First Amendment. It cannot easily accommodate or
explain, for example, constitutional protection against governmental
compulsion to pledge allegiance to the flag. 6 Of course, refusal to salute
the flag can be a public statement, intended and understood as an act of
protest. But quietly refraining from a flag salute can also be a private act
that neither communicates, nor is intended to communicate anything to
any one. A tradition that focuses solely on the interests of a public audi-
ence puts private inaction at the periphery of the First Amendment, if
not beyond concern altogether.37
Perceiving inadequacies in the Meiklejohn view, some of the more
recent theoretical scholarship has examined speech from the perspective
of the speaker and found that autonomy in matters of speech has value
worthy of constitutional protection regardless of whether it serves the
informational needs of the public. 38 One branch of the new scholarship
emphasizes, as above, that the Speech Clause is part of an amendment
that protects religious freedom as well. Because speech, assembly, and
religion are all elements of liberty grounded at least in part in individual
integrity and autonomy,39 the Speech and Religion Clauses can be seen in
unity as safeguards of independent conscience and individual moral
sovereignty. 40
36. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); See infra
notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
37. In defense of that position, one might ask how non-communicative activity or absten-
tion could constitute "free speech." See, eg., H. KALVEN, A WORTHY TRADITION 254
(1988); cf F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 50-52 (1982) (free
speech principle must exclude non-communicative expression); Scanlon, Freedom of Expres-
sion and Categories of Expression, 40 U. Prrr. L. REv. 519, 521 (1979) (private speech not
protected). Putting the question this way involves some sleightofhand, however. By its terms,
the First Amendment does not protect "free speech" but rather "freedom of speech," a phrase
broad enough to embrace freedom to decide both what to say and whether to say anything at
all.
38. Several relatively early works suggested that the traditional view is either too limited
or altogether misguided. Thomas Emerson's recognition of individual self-fulfillment as one
among several first amendment values was a catalyst for much of the literature on speaker
autonomy, both for and against. See Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877, 879-81 (1963); EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 699
(1970). In addition, Charles Fried and Ronald Dworkin criticized purely consequentialist ar-
guments for freedom of speech in broader theoretical works on rights. C. FRIED, RIGHT AND
WRONG 109-10 (1978); R. DWORKIN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, (Introduction),15-16
(1977); R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 385-97 (1985).
39. E. BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 59 (1989).
40. D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 165-78 (1986); See also D.A.J.
Richards, Toleration and Free Speech, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323, 330-36 (1988) ("a person has
the right to use speech to develop herself or interact with others in a manner that corresponds
to her values.").
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Apart from this, the traditional account of the relationship between
speech and democracy raises questions of its own. Democracy itself is
valued not only because it respects the self-governing capacities of ra-
tional subjects41 but also because it provides a means for them to achieve
individual self-realization, a broader value served by speaker autonomy
whether it promotes decision making by others or not.42
Moreover, it is far from clear that the Meiklejohn tradition was
founded on an adequate conception of what our democracy is.
Meiklejohn's paradigm was participatory majoritarianism in a small
town meeting, 43 a vision of democracy foreign to the experience of most
Americans.' This paradigm is both too rich, in its direct majoritarian
assumptions, and too thin, in its conception of democracy as confined to
the making of decisions.45 Freedom to dissent, including the freedom
silently to withhold assent, is not. merely a servant of the majoritarian
decision making public debate is supposed to foster, but is itself an essen-
41. This was Thomas Scanlon's answer to why speech is valuable assuming that it fulfills
the role Meiklejohn saw for it. Scanlon, Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 204 (1972). Following Kant and Mill, Scanlon argued that freedom of speech is neces-
sary for citizens to recognize governmental authority while regarding themselves as equal,
autonomous, rational agents. Id at 214; cf. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE
L.J. 1105, 1131-42 (1979). Although this emphasis on autonomy may have inspired reaction
against the Meiklejohn tradition, Scanlon's treatment does not fit within the speaker-autonomy
theories I contrast with it. In Scanlon's view, freedom of speech is necessary for prospective
recipients of speech-not speakers-to recognize governmental authority while regarding
themselves as autonomous, rational, and equal. See Scanlon, supra, at 215. In a later Article,
Scanlon abandoned parts of his earlier theory and recognized that speakers as well as audi-
ences have worthy interests in freedom of speech. Scanlon, supra note 37, at 521-23. Still,
Scanlon's arguments for speaker interests remained dependent on "wide audience[s]" and
"larger purposes," id. at 521, and thus did not differ significantly from the Meiklejohn tradi-
tion's reliance on audience interests alone.
42. M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 11-24 (1984).
43. A MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 22-27
(1948).
44. Meiklejohn's recognition that town-meeting democracy "is not a Hyde Park," id. at
23, begs the question of what democracy means and what values it can have in the impover-
ished urban settings of our mass society.
45. See S. SHRIFFIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 72-81
(1990); cf Holmes, "Liberal Constraints on Private Power?: Reflections on the Origins and
Rationale of Access Regulation," reprinted in DEMOCRACY AND THE MASS MEDIA 31-32 (J.
Lichtenberg ed.,1990); Hutchinson, Talking the Good Life: From Free Speech to Democratic
Dialogue, 1 YALE J. L. & LIBERATION 17 (1989) (dialogue as an essential element of commu-
nitarian democracy); L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 50-53 (1986) (noting that some
restrictions on speech forbidden by the First Amendment are consistent with majority rule in
that (1) the restrictions are sponsored and adopted through democratic procedures and (2) the
restrictions would not eliminate information essential for the minimal conception of democ-
racy to continue functioning).
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tial element of democracy as we know it.
4 6
Granting all this, recognition of the audience-independent values of
speech autonomy does not require that audience interests be disregarded
altogether, though some would markedly narrow their significance.47
Whatever value we assign autonomy in matters of conscience, it hardly
makes the public's interest in receiving information trivial. Because any
capacity to exercise speech autonomy depends on language, values, criti-
cal habits, and information the individual acquires through social inter-
action,48 speech autonomy depends as much on public debate as public
debate depends on speech autonomy. Thus, instead of supplanting the
46. S. SHIFRIN, supra note 45, at 72-81. As Stephen Holmes has observed, "Consent
confers no authority unless the possibility of unpunished dissent is institutionally guaranteed."
Holmes, supra note 45, reprinted in DEMOCRACY AND THE MASS MEDIA 31 (J. Lichtenberg
ed. 1990). Given Shiffrin's rejection of Kantian theory, S. SHIFRIN, supra note 45, at 110-32,
it may seem odd to classify his theory as one emphasizing speaker autonomy. One might read
Shiffrin as seeking to protect dissent, not dissenters, and thus as embracing a variant of the
traditional view. That reading seems mistaken, however, for two reasons. First, Shiffrin treats
protection against the compulsory flag salute as paradigmatic of what the First Amendment
should protect without relying on any communicative effect of abstention. Second, in applica-
tion, Shiffrin's eagerness to protect dissent depends on the "independence" of its source. Id. at
153; see also id. at 161 (linking autonomy with dissent); id. at 167 (dissent as repository of first
amendment values).
47. Among the scholars focusing on speaker autonomy interests, Edwin Baker appears to
take the narrowest view of the extent to which audience interests should be taken into account.
According to Baker, the First Amendment protects nonviolent and noncoercive methods of
obtaining information to foster self-realization by listeners, but their interests are separate
from, and in no way augment, protected speaker interests. E. BAKER, supra note 39, at 67.
The public interest in receiving product information, for example, provides no basis in Baker's
view for protecting commercial speech. Iad at 68. David Richards, by contrast, finds grounds
in independent moral sovereignty for broadly protecting the interests of audiences as well as
speakers. D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION supra note 40, at 170. And
the contrary assertions of one critic notwithstanding, Powe, Scholarship and Markets, 56 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 172, 179 (1987), Martin Redish's focus on self-realization not only by speakers
(by developing their uniquely human faculties) but also by members of the public audience (by
facilitating their life-affecting decisions). M. REDISH, supra note 42, at 21-22, 30. More specif-
ically, Redish embraces majoritarian politics-and, consequently, speech fostering democratic
government-as a second-best alternative to complete individual self-rule, which would pre-
clude a functioning society. Id. at 23-24.
48. Recognition that important aspects of the individual are socially constituted does not
require abandonment of our respect for individual integrity; it only requires abandonment of
an anthropology of the self as disengaged and presocial. See D. GAUTHIER, MORALS BY
AGREEMENT 349-50 (1986) (examining the meaning of autonomy for individuals whose very
self-consciousness may be socially constituted); Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of Liber-
alism, 18 POL. THEORY 6, 21 (1990) (contemporary liberalism committed only to self capable
of reflecting critically on socialized values); Larmore, Political Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY
339, 349-52 (1990) (founding neutrality on equal respect for persons capable of thinking and
acting on basis of reasons, whatever their source); C. TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 514
(1989) (ideals of self-responsible reasons and freedom not dependent on disengaged
anthropology).
Spring 1991] AUTONOMY DEBATE AND CORPORATE SPEECH 551
Meiklejohn view, we should view the First Amendment as normatively
complex, embodying both private and public ideals: one of speaker au-
tonomy and another of public debate, sometimes complementing and at
other times limiting each other. 9
The ideals of speaker autonomy and rich public debate have each
informed the Supreme Court's decisions, not as parts of a coherent free
speech theory, but as separate normative elements available to be in-
voked or ignored in different cases. Usually, the Court's theoretical am-
bivalence is inconsequential, because the two ideals converge on the
protection of speech. Political speech, for example, is given heightened
protection because a speaker's autonomy is most instrumentally valuable
when it provides information of public concern. 0 Thus, in New York
Times, Inc. v. Sullivan, 1 there was no need to weigh speakers' interests
in being free to utter defamatory falsehoods by mistake, because first
amendment protection served the "profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open .... 2
Soon after Sullivan was decided, there were proclamations that it
might signal the Court's adoption of the Meiklejohn view, not only by
Meiklejohn's most influential scholarly follower 3 but also by Justice
William Brennan, who wrote the Sullivan opinion. 4 Later, Justice Bren-
nan distanced himself from Meiklejohn and his followers by insisting that
the value of speech is not solely instrumental but "intrinsic" to the dig-
nity of autonomous individuals entitled to equal respect. 5
49. For criticism of autonomy-based justifications for freedom of speech, see, for example,
F. SCHAUER, supra note 37, at 60-72, and BeVier, supra note 27, at 317-22.
50. As the Court stated in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), "[S]peech concern-
ing public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government." Id. at 74-
75.
51. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
52. Id. at 270. Choice of ideals was not entirely without consequence in Sullivan. If
speaker-autonomy interests had been the main concern, the Court would have had reason to
hold that defamatory falsehoods are most protected when made with actual malice, since false-
hood involves moral choice especially when intended. See S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN
PUBLIC AND PRIvATE LIFE 6-13 (1989). Libel with actual malice might, for example, express
a self-defining commitment to nihilism. Instead of maintaining room for fundamental personal
choices of that kind, Sullivan protects falsehoods that least express a speaker's moral auton-
omy, because misstatements of fact mistakenly made despite careful regard for the truth do not
embody personal choice of any kind.
53. Kalven, supra note 26, at 221.
54. Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amend-
ment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1965).
55. E.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 183-84 n.1 (1979) (dissenting opinion); FEC v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986).
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The issue nevertheless has practical significance, because autonomy
does not always foster public debate. As noted above, the compulsion of
a flag salute does not necessarily remove any information or advocacy
from public discourse. Accordingly, recognition of the right to refrain
from speaking was originally driven solely by concern for individual au-
tonomy in matters of conscience.
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,5 6 the
Supreme Court vindicated the claims of Jehovah's Witnesses, who chal-
lenged enforcement of state laws and school board regulations requiring
students to salute and pledge allegiance to the flag. The Barnette Court
found that compliance with the requirement conflicted with the Jeho-
vah's Witnesses' religious beliefs.57 Although the Free Exercise and Es-
tablishment Clauses were clearly implicated, the Court did not base its
decision on them. Instead, the Court found a more general "right of self-
determination in matters that touch individual opinion and personal atti-
tude" in the First Amendment.5" The problem with the compulsory
pledge was not simply that the state required students to speak or even
that it prescribed the content of their statements.59 Rather, the compul-
sory pledge was problematic primarily because it required affirmation of
a particular belief.' As Justice Jackson explained, forcing students to
confess faith in a state orthodoxy "invades the sphere of intellect and
spirit" that the First Amendment "reserve[s] from all official control."61
The same concerns led the Court in Wooley v. Maynard 62 to protect
private property from compulsory use for display of a message not wel-
comed by the owner. The Court invalidated a New Hampshire law re-
quiring that license plates on private automobiles carry the state motto,
which Jehovah's Witnesses challenged on grounds that the motto was
repugnant to their beliefs. 63 Although this controversy arose from a dis-
play on private property and not from a vocal affirmation of belief, the.
state's invasion of conscience, not property, was dispositive. The Court
emphasized, "The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking
are complementary components of the broader concept of 'individual
56. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
57. Id. at 629.
58. Id. at 630.
59. It seems obvious that teachers, acting as state agents, can require students to answer
questions in class and that significant advantages and disadvantages follow from the correct-
ness of their responses as determined, again, by teachers acting as agents for the state.
60. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 631, 633.
61. Id. at 642.
62. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
63. Id. at 707.
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freedom of mind.'""
Concern for individual conscience, however, has not entirely con-
tained the Court's protection of speaker autonomy. When the Court ex-
tended the right to refrain from expression to protect a newspaper's
editorial autonomy in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,6" con-
cern for freedom of conscience played little role. The Tornillo Court
unanimously struck down a state statute granting a right of reply in
newspapers that attacked a candidate's character or record. A candidate
who sought access for a reply in the Miami Herald attempted to defend
this statute as serving the ideal of rich public debate under conditions of
scarcity unknown to the Framers. He argued that the declining number
and concentrated ownership of.newspapers had placed the ability to in-
form and shape public opinion in the hands of a few and thus artificially
restricted the diversity of views in the marketplace of ideas. 6 The Court
did not dispute these claims, and stated in a later case that the candidate
in Tornillo had "substantiated" them.67 Instead, the Court observed that
the right of access might lead papers to limit their own expression68
and-apparently independent of this concern for public debate--deter-
mined that the statute unconstitutionally limited "editorial discretion,"
an autonomy interest the Court tied to liberty of the press, not individual
conscience.
69
Tornillo's recognition of an autonomy interest in editorial discretion
substantially extended the right to refrain from expression,70 but the de-
cision has not been given an expansive interpretation in subsequent cases.
64. Id. at 714 (citation omitted). To the same effect, the Court stated that "the right of
freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment... includes both the right to speak
freely and to refrain from speaking at all." Id.; see also Harper & Row Publishing, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 559 (First Amendment protects "right to refrain from
speaking" as an element of "freedom of thought and expression").
65. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
66. Id. at 248-50.
67. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 n.30 (1978).
68. The Court found that a candidate's response would consume space that the paper
might otherwise devote to other material and that a paper might censor its own editorials to
avoid triggering a right of reply. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256-57 & n.22.
69. The Court described its editorial discretion rationale as applicable "[e]ven if a newspa-
per would face no additional costs to comply with a compulsory access law and would not be
forced to forego publication of news or opinion by the inclusion of a reply .... Id. at 258
n.24. The only explanation given for the protection of editorial discretion is that "liberty of
the press is in peril as soon as the government tries to compel what is to go into a newspaper."
Id. Benno Schmidt has described the Tornillo opinion as "apologetic" and "devoid of reason-
ing." B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS V. PUBLIC AccEss 12-13 (1976).
70. Judith Lichtenberg characterizes the right of editorial autonomy recognized in
Tornillo as "a property right in the guise of a free speech right." Lichtenberg, Foundations and
Limits of Freedom of the Press, 16 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 329, 347 (1987).
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The Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to find sanctuary in the First
Amendment for autonomous control over the expressive use of non-press
property unless the concerns of conscience underlying Barnette and
Wooley are at stake. In FCC v. League of Women Voters,71 for example,
the Court rejected the argument that editorializing by public broadcast-
ers unconstitutionally compels taxpayers to support the expression of
views they do not hold. The Court distinguished Wooley as "a case in
which an individual taxpayer [was] forced in his daily life to identify with
particular views .... ,72
Similarly, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,7 3 the Court re-
jected the argument that provisions of a state constitution creating public
speech rights in private shopping centers violated the First Amendment.
Like the right of access struck down in Tornillo, these rights responded
to concentration of the ability to address significant audiences: in an in-
creasingly suburban society, much of the audience speakers once could
reach on public street corners has moved inside shopping malls owned by
private companies. The Pruneyard Court specifically acknowledged that
the state-law right of access interfered with the owner's property rights.
This interference, however, did not violate the rights recognized in Bar-
nette, Wooley, or Tornillo,74 because the state did not dictate a particular
message, did not threaten public association of the owner with views ex-
pressed on its property, and neither penalized the owner for past expres-
sion nor created a disincentive for making controversial statements in the
future.
Barnette and Wooley show that the ideals of autonomy and rich pub-
lic debate do not always converge; Pruneyard and Tornillo show that the
two ideals may directly conflict when the distribution of economic and
natural resources gives some but not others the ability to reach a signifi-
cant audience. Under those conditions, protecting the autonomy of one
who wishes not to have her property used to disseminate someone else's
message may impoverish public debate.
The Court has yet to settle on whether debate or autonomy should
prevail when these public and private first amendment ideals conflict. By
the end of the 1960s, it appeared that the Court would subordinate
speaker autonomy when it threatened public debate. In Red Lion Broad-
71. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
72. Id at 385 n.16.
73. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
74. Id. at 85-88. The Court also suggested that Tornilo was limited to the institutional
press, by characterizing the doctrine of editorial autonomy as "rest[ing] on the principle that
the State cannot tell a newspaper what it must print." Id. at 88.
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casting Co. v. FCC,75 the Court found the public's interest in receiving
social, political, aesthetic, moral, and other ideas "paramount." The Red
Lion Court vindicated that interest against a claim by broadcast licensees
to editorial autonomy of the kind subsequently accorded newspapers in
Tornillo.
76
Less than a decade passed, however, before the Court's emphasis
began to shift to speaker autonomy. Tornillo suggested that a shift was
under way, by recognizing a right of editorial autonomy that must be
respected at the expense of public debate. The shift in priorities became
more apparent two years later when the Court, in Buckley v. Valeo,"
invalidated a statutory ceiling on independent campaign expenditures,
basing its decision on Tornillo. The Buckley Court stated in terms of a
bedrock principle: "the concept that government may restrict the speech
of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment ....
The Buckley Court seemed to view this maxim as instrumental in
ensuring rich public debate. The Court found that restricting the auton-
omy of speakers to equalize their relative voices is inconsistent with the
Framers' design "to secure 'the widest possible dissemination of informa-
tion from diverse and antagonistic sources' and 'to assure unfettered in-
terchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people.' ,,79 By this reasoning, the public interest in re-
ceiving diverse ideas and information might still be paramount. But as
Barnette and Tornillo had shown before, the protection of autonomy
would not be contained by its origins. The Buckley maxim soon came to
stand as a seemingly insurmountable obstacle to efforts undertaken by
states to enrich public debate when the ability to communicate with a
significant audience has been concentrated in the hands of a few.
75. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
76. In Red Lion, the Court upheld the FCC's personal attack and political editorializing
rules, which required broadcast licensees to provide reasonable opportunities for response by
people who were personally criticized during the licensee's presentation of public issues and by
candidates the licensee opposed, or whose competitors the licensee endorsed, in political
editorials.
77. 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
78. Id. at 48-49. In Buckley, the Court struck down a provision of the Federal Election
Campaign Act that established a $1000 annual ceiling on independent expenditures for or
against any candidate for federal office, but upheld limits on campaign contributions (and
various record-keeping and reporting requirements) established by the same statute.
79. Id. at 49 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 269 (1964)
(quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945), and Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))).
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II. Decline of the Public Debate Ideal in Cases Concerning
Corporate Speech
Buckley's impact was particularly profound for corporate rights
under the First Amendment, as two seminal cases show. In First Na-
tional Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 0 the Court first recognized speech
rights of corporations other than the institutional press. In Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,"1 the Court first held that
non-press corporations may invoke the First Amendment to resist state
statutes granting others access to corporate property for communicative
purposes. Although the opinions in both cases express concern for pub-
lic discourse, Bellotti displays an emerging ambivalence about the pri-
macy of the public debate ideal, and Pacific Gas reflects the ascendance
of autonomy to a position of paramount importance.
In Bellotti, the Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute prohibit-
ing banking and business corporations from making expenditures to in-
fluence referenda other than those materially affecting pecuniary
corporate interests.8 2 The Court treated this prohibition on expenditures
as a prohibition on speech itself, because, as the Court had observed in
Buckley, "virtually every means of [effective communication] in today's
mass society requires the expenditure of money." 3 Recast as a prohibi-
tion on political editorial advertisements, the Massachusetts statute
would obviously offend the public's interest in rich debate unless some
special circumstance could be shown. Political advocacy is "at the heart
of the First Amendment's protection," occupying a privileged position
because "a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the
80. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
81. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
82. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977). The statute applied the same
prohibition to candidate elections as well, but only those parts pertaining to referenda were
challenged. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26. Following the defeat of two initiatives to impose a
graduated income tax, the statute had been amended to specify that no issues of individual
taxation would be deemed to affect corporate interests. Id. at 769-70 n.3. The Court suggested
that this chronology was evidence of bad legislative motive, id. at 785, but that does not appear
to have been decisive. In subsequent cases applying Bellotti, the Court has not discussed bad
legislative motives. E.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530
(1980).
83. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786 n.23; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19; see also FEC v. NCPAC, 470
U.S. 480, 493 (1985) ("allowing the presentation of views while forbidding the expenditure of
more than $1000 to present them is much like allowing a speaker in a public hall to express his
views while denying him the use of an amplifying system."). In order to focus on the Court's
treatment of corporate speakers, this Article assumes that the Court has been right to equate
spending with speech, despite vigorous criticism of the equation by others. E.g., Wright, Poli-
tics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech? 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1005-06 (1976).
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free discussion of governmental affairs." 4  The issues, then, were
whether corporations could assert first amendment claims at all and, if
so, whether some problem related to corporate origination could provide
a justification for restricting speech that would otherwise clearly be
protected.
Declining to announce whether corporations have any autonomy in-
terest in speaking that warrants constitutional protection, 5 the Bellotti
Court explained that society's interest in open and informed discussion is
an independent concern of the First Amendment 6 that may reach far-
ther than the individual interests of speakers.8 7 Therefore, the Court
held, the fact that political advocacy emanates from a corporate source
cannot, without more, deprive it of first amendment protection. As the
Court explained, "The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capac-
ity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its
source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.""8
By relying on the informational value of corporate speech to con-
clude that restrictions demand a compelling justification, the Bellotti
opinion begins with a public debate rationale. The manner in which jus-
tifications offered by the state were rejected suggests, however, that the
Court considered the ideal of speaker autonomy more important. The
state argued that its statute was needed to protect public debate and dem-
ocratic processes against the distorting effects of corporate domination,
because corporations could afford to drown out the views expressed by
others.89 The Court acknowledged that preserving the integrity of elec-
toral processes is an interest "of the highest importance,"90 but it implied
84. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776-77 (citation omitted).
85. The Court specifically affirmed the value of audience-independent speaker interests by
observing that "[t]he individual's interest in self-expression is a concern of the First Amend-
ment separate from the concern for open and informed discussion," id. at 777 n.12, but it
expressly avoided the question "whether corporations 'have' First Amendment rights and, if
so, whether they are coextensive with those of natural persons." Id. at 776.
86. Id. at 777 n.12.
87. Id. at 775-76.
88. Id. at 777. For this reason, the Court refused to distinguish ordinary business corpo-
rations from the media corporations that make up the institutional press, whose protection
under the First Amendment was already well established. The Court acknowledged the "spe-
cial and constitutionally recognized role" of the press, id. at 781, but found that the public has
an interest in hearing the views of business corporations as well. Id. at 782 n.18. Chief Justice
Burger filed a concurring opinion focusing on the difficulty (if not impossibility, in Burger's
view) of distinguishing media corporations from business corporations. According to Burger,
the distinction would be unworkable in view of the complexity of corporate structures that
often locate institutions of mass media in diversified conglomerates. Id. at 796 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
89. Id. at 789.
90. Id. at 788-89.
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that the distortion of public discourse cannot justify a restriction on cor-
porate advocacy. Even if corporations threatened to distort public de-
bate, the Court suggested, restrictions implemented to compensate for
such distortions would violate the principle that the government cannot
restrict the speech of some elements of society to enhance the voice of
others.91 The Buckley maxim thus began to change from an instrument
for promoting public debate to a cruder shield for speaker autonomy.
These aspects of the Bellotti opinion were gratuitous, since the deci-
sion could have been based solely on the public debate ideal. Because
neither legislative findings nor record evidence substantiated the claim
that corporations distort public debate,92 the Court had no basis to con-
clude that silencing corporations would do anything but reduce public
discourse. The Court granted that serious issues would be presented on a
different record.93 Invocation of the Buckley maxim as an autonomy-
based constraint on what states can do to promote public debate could
therefore be regarded, for a time, as dictum.
Eight years later, however, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission,9" the Court extended to corporations the right to
refrain from forced communication. There, the record was too simple
and the normative conflict too stark to conceal the subordination of pub-
lic debate to the private interest of speaker autonomy. A fractured
Court invalidated an order of the California Public Utility Commission
requiring Pacific Gas to distribute in its billing envelopes written materi-
91. See id. at 790-91 (citation omitted). The state also asserted that its prohibition against
campaign advocacy by corporations was needed to protect shareholders from management's
use of corporate resources for political purposes not related to the corporation's business and
not supported by the shareholders themselves. In relation to this interest, the Court found the
statute both underinclusive, because it failed to protect dissident shareholders against use of
corporate funds for expression on public issues unless and until they were made the subject of
referenda, and overinclusive, because it prohibited corporate expression even if it reflected
unanimous shareholder agreement. This lack of fit belied the assertion that the statute was
intended to protect dissident shareholders and showed that the abridgement of expression was
not substantially related to the protection of dissident shareholders even if that were its pur-
pose. Id. at 792-95. In addition, the Court cast doubt on whether protecting dissident share-
holders is a sufficiently compelling governmental purpose to justify a restriction of political
advocacy. It rejected the proposition that corporate speech coerces the support of dissident
shareholders for the expression of views they abhor, because a shareholder's investment in the
corporation is voluntary and may be withdrawn if the corporation's expression is offensive or
wasteful. Id. at 794 n.34.
92. Id. at 789.
93. Id.
94. 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality opinion).
95. Only a bare majority of the Justices agreed that the Commission order was unconsti-
tutional, and they could not agree upon the reasons. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Bren-
nan, Powell, and O'Connor formed a plurality; Justice Marshall concurred separately; and
Justices White, Stevens, and Rehnquist dissented.
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als submitted by another organization interested in regulations affecting
the utility's customers. Although the plurality's opinion expresses con-
cern for public debate as well as for speaker autonomy, much of its rea-
soning is self-refuting. Ultimately, concern for autonomy interests
appears to explain the plurality's decision.
A consumer advocacy group called Toward Utility Rate Normaliza-
tion (TURN) asked the Public Utilities Commission to prohibit Pacific
Gas from using its billing envelopes to distribute political editorials.
While proceedings on TURN's request were pending, the Supreme Court
held, in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission,96 that Bel-
lotti applies to regulated monopolies as it does to other corporations.
The Edison Court therefore invalidated a prohibition like the one TURN
had requested. Perhaps for this reason, the Commission in Pacific Gas
refused to prohibit the utility from distributing its own editorials, but it
ordered the utility to insert printed materials submitted by TURN into
its billing envelopes four times a year.
The Commission determined that once monthly bills and legal no-
tices were inserted in billing envelopes, any space remaining for addi-
tional materials that would not increase the cost of postage belonged to
ratepayers.97 It then allocated this "extra space" between competing
speakers in a manner deemed most beneficial to the ratepayers who
owned it. Finding that "ratepayers will benefit more from exposure to a
variety of views than they will from only [the views] of PG&E," the
Commission ordered that TURN be permitted "to use the extra space
four times a year for the next two years ... to raise funds and to commu-
nicate with ratepayers."98 Whenever TURN did so, its insert would be
required to carry a disclaimer stating that it did not express the views of
the utility.99
In assessing how the ideals of autonomy and debate influenced the
Court's decision, it is crucial to understand that the Commission order
left the utility free to distribute its own newsletter in billing envelopes.
The utility could, without cost, use any extra space remaining after in-
serting TURN's materials, and it could use all extra space in the eight
months of each year not allotted to TURN."° Even if TURN's materi-
als completely exhausted extra space, the utility would not be prevented
from distributing its own newsletter, because extra space was defined pri-
96. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
97. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 5-6.
98. Id. at 6 (citation omitted).
99. Id. at 7.
100. Id. at 6.
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manly by surplus postage and not the physical dimensions of billing en-
velopes.1°1 Thus, whenever "extra space" was exhausted, the utility
could include additional materials simply by paying the marginal cost of
additional postage 1 2 -a cost Consolidated Edison implied the utility
could be made to bear. 103
Nevertheless, the Court held the Commission's access order uncon-
stitutional. Writing for a plurality of four, Justice Powell found that Pa-
cific Gas would likely censor itself to avoid assisting TURN in
controverting whatever position the utility might take on any given is-
sue.1 4 The plurality held that the Commission's order impermissibly re-
quired the utility "to associate with speech with which it disagrees," in
that it might "be forced either to appear to agree with TURN's views or
to respond."
' 10 5
On close reading, what troubled the plurality was not forced associ-
ation at all, for it acknowledged that the disclaimer TURN's inserts were
required to carry would "avoid giving readers the mistaken impression
that TURN's words are really those of [the utility]. ' 10 6 Instead, what
might cause the utility to respond was the vehemence of the utility's disa-
greement with the substance of TURN's views. 107 Finding that the util-
ity would "feel compelled to respond," the plurality mischaracterized the
101. See id. at 5-6.
102. Id. at 6.
103. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 543 (1980). Indeed,
Consolidated Edison seemed to invite almost every aspect of the Commission order in Pacific
Gas. The Court found in Consolidated Edison that insertion of a utility's editorials into billing
envelopes does not necessarily exclude other important information, noted that an order to
include other material might be permissible, and implied that the Commission could constitu-
tionally require the utility's shareholders to bear the costs of the utility's political inserts. Id.
at 543 & n.13.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented in Consolidated Edison on the
grounds that eliminating ratepayer subsidization of utility editorializing would require charg-
ing all fixed costs of mailing bills to shareholders rather than ratepayers, which they thought
no less restrictive than a total ban. Id. at 555 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As they read the
majority's opinion, it did not foreclose either (1) a definition of property rights under state law
under which ratepayers, not utility shareholders, own billing envelopes, which would deny
utilities any special claim to their use, or (2) allocation to shareholders of all costs of envelopes,
postage, and mailing lists so that ratepayers would bear only the costs of printing and inserting
their bills and public service announcements. Id. at 556.
104. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 14.
105. Id. at 15.
106. Id. at 15 n.11.
107. Id. Although acknowledged not to exist, the associational problem is later employed
in Justice Powell's opinion for rhetorical advantage: "Were the government freely able to
compel corporate speakers to propound political messages with which they disagree .... the
government could require speakers to affirm in one breath that which they deny in the next."
Id. at 16. How the Commission could be read to require the utility to "affirm" anything is
difficult to imagine in view of the disclaimer TURN's inserts were required to carry.
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Commission's order as one that actually "forced [a] response."108 The
plurality then treated the order as if it forced a particular response: "For
corporations as for individuals," Justice Powell declared, "the choice to
speak includes within it the choice of what not to say."" °
Put charitably, the plurality's analysis is difficult to understand.
The Commission order left the utility free to say anything or nothing at
all. Even if Pacific Gas felt compelled to respond to TURN, it retained
complete discretion to make whatever response it wished. It is possible
that by engaging in a debate initiated by TURN, the utility would divert
its attention and resources from advocacy on completely different issues.
Overstating this as something the utility would be "required" to do, Jus-
tice Powell suggested that the resulting alteration of the utility's message
would itself be an abridgement of free speech. 1 °
Ultimately, the plurality's entire analysis appears to rest on concerns
for autonomy in the control of private property. Because TURN's right
of access was not contingent on any prior statement by the utility, self-
censorship could only be motivated by the utility's desire to avoid "as-
sist[ing]" dissemination of opposing views.' Even without the Commis-
sion order, any public statement by the utility risks provoking a public
response from TURN-the Commission order simply enabled TURN to
use the utility's envelopes for that response. Likewise, public statements
by TURN and others may influence the utility's agenda whether mailed
in utility envelopes or not. Thus, agenda alteration was a constitutional
concern only because it might result from "a content-based grant of ac-
cess to private property."
' 1 2
Finally, addressing the decisive issue directly, Justice Powell ex-
plained that the Commission's order entailed use of the utility's property
even though "extra space" in billing envelopes belonged to the
ratepayers:
[The Commission] decided only that the ratepayers own the "extra
space" in the envelope .... The envelopes themselves, the bills,
and [the utility's newsletter] all remain [the utility's] property. The
Commission's access order thus clearly requires [the utility] to use
its property as a vehicle for spreading a message with which it
disagrees.
11 3
108. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 16.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 14.
112. Id. at 16-17.
113. Id. at 17.
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This use of private property to spread a message not welcomed by its
owner was, according to Justice Powell, a violation of the First Amend-
ment as interpreted in Wooley v. Maynard."4
Denying the Court a majority opinion, Justice Marshall concurred
only in the judgment. He, too, viewed the Commission order as a sub-
stantial intrusion on the utility's property right.115 Unlike the plurality,
however, he acknowledged that interference with the utility's speech was
"very slight." '116 In Justice Marshall's view, these rights could constitu-
tionally be abrogated "to attain a permissible legislative object," but he
found the Commission's object impermissible under the Buckley maxim:
the state could not burden the utility's speech to enhance the voice of
TURN. 117
Remarkably absent from both Justice Powell's and Justice Mar-
shall's opinions is any consideration of what net effect the Commission's
order would have on public debate. Even if including TURN's insert
would curtail the utility's own expression, as Justice Marshall antici-
pated, or would alter the utility's choice of issues to address, as Justice
Powell believed, the Commission order might have enriched public de-
bate by increasing the diversity of views presented to ratepayers. The
Commission expressly found that its order would have this effect.118
Neither the plurality nor the concurrence disputed that conclusion.
Thus, while Beiotti signalled the Court's ambivalence about the rel-
ative importance of public debate and speaker autonomy, Pacific Gas &
Electric can only be understood as according private interests in auton-
omy greater significance. At least outside the regulation of broadcasting,
subversion of the normative hierarchy established in Red Lion, which
called the public's right to receive information and ideas from diverse
sources "paramount," now seemed complete.
III. Resurgence of the Public Debate Ideal
Pacific Gas completed the normative subversion suggested earlier by
Beiotti, but neither decision firmly established the new hierarchy. A new
majority, including the dissenting justices in Bellotti and Pacific Gas,119
recently undertook the task of reconsideration. The Court upheld a stat-
114. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 17.
115. Id. at 22-23 (Marshall, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 24.
117. Id. at 24-25.
118. See id. at 6.
119. Justices Rehnquist, Brennan, Marshall, and White dissented from the Court's decision
in Bellotti. Justices Rehnquist, White, and Stevens dissented in Pacific Gas.
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ute similar to the one it struck down in Bellotti, calling into question
much of what the Bellotti Court previously decided and the value ac-
corded the autonomy of corporate speakers in Pacific Gas. The new deci-
sion, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,120 shows a renewed
commitment to the ideal of public debate12' and a pronounced skepti-
cism about whether restrictions on corporate speech implicate the ideal
of speaker autonomy in any way.
The Austin Court upheld a Michigan statute that, like the statute
invalidated in Bellotti, prohibits the expenditure of corporate funds for
political advocacy. Specifically, the statute prohibits "independent ex-
penditures" of general treasury funds in support of, or in opposition to,
any candidate for state office.122 Unlike the statute in Bellotti, however,
the statute upheld in Austin allows corporations to make such expendi-
tures from separate, segregated funds used solely for political purposes
and accumulated solely through contributions from natural persons hav-
ing specified relationships with the corporation.123
Austin reaffirms the central principal of Bellotti by acknowledging
that independent campaign expenditures "constitute political expression
'at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment,'" and
that the corporate status of a speaker cannot, without more, wholly ex-
clude political speech from constitutional protection.1 24 Therefore, as in
Bellotti, the restriction of political advocacy could only stand if narrowly
tailored to a compelling governmental interest.
1 25
Here, however, the new majority departed from Bellotti. Aban-
doning the skepticism displayed in that earlier case, the majority in Aus-
tin found this exacting standard satisfied by the compelling governmental
120. 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990).
121. Resurgence of the public debate ideal is also suggested by Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990), which the Court decided just a few weeks after Austin. In Metro
Broadcasting, the Court upheld the FCC's minority preference and distress sale policies against
equal protection challenge, by finding them substantially related to the important governmen-
tal objective of broadcast diversity. In doing so, the Court reiterated its declaration in Red
Lion that the public's right to receive information and advocacy is "paramount," and empha-
sized that diversity of views and information "serves important First Amendment values." Id
at 3010.
122. MIcH. CoMp. LAWS § 169.254(1) (1979).
123. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 169.255 (1979).
124. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1396 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976)). The Court
explained that the allowance of expenditures from a segregated fund could not adequately
compensate for the prohibition against expenditure of treasury funds, because substantial ad-
ministrative costs and disincentives for establishing a segregated fund would burden corporate
political expression even if they did not prevent it altogether. Id. at 1396-97. In this respect,
the Court followed FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 254-56 (1987). See
infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
125. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397.
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interest in preventing corporations from exercising undue influence on
elections and thus "corrupting" the democratic process.
12 6
The ideal of public debate lies at the heart of the Court's decision
and explains the different results in Austin and Bellotti. The Austin
Court found that corporations distort the democratic process when they
amass economic resources with the assistance of "special advantages"
conferred under state law and then use those resources for political advo-
cacy. 127 Because the availability of these resources reflects the economi-
cally motivated decisions of investors and customers rather than public
perceptions of the corporation's political wisdom, the use of general
treasury funds for campaign advocacy creates "an unfair advantage in
the political marketplace" that might allow a corporation to exert an
influence on elections having "little or no correlation to the public's sup-
port for the corporation's political ideas."12 By requiring that corporate
campaign advocacy be financed by contributions from natural persons,
the statute ensured that such advocacy would reflect "actual public
support."
129
To harmonize this reasoning with the Buckley maxim, the Court
denied that the Michigan statute attempted to equalize the influence of
speakers on elections. 130 According to the majority opinion, the decision
in Austin was based not merely on corporations' ability to accumulate
wealth but on the "unique state-conferred corporate structure" and "spe-
cial advantages" conferred by state law that facilitate such
accumulation. 131
It is not clear whether state-conferred advantages were indepen-
dently essential to the Court's reasoning or were instead an element of
the Court's concern that corporate speech may not reflect public support.
In an earlier opinion rehearsing the Austin rationale in dictum, 3 2 the
Court implied that while state-conferred advantages support restrictions
on corporate campaign advocacy, they are not essential to the validity of
126. Id at 1397-98.
127. Id. at 1397. The Court listed "limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment
of the accumulation and distribution of assets" as examples of special advantages. Id. The
opinion does not elaborate on the meaning or individual significance of these examples.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1398. Although the Court claimed to follow Bellotti, this analysis is drawn from
the opinion of Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissenting from the
Rellotti decision. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 at 809-12 (White, J.
dissenting).
130. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397-98.
131. Id.; see supra note 127.
132. FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 256-60 (1986); see infra notes
136-38 and accompanying text.
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such restrictions. 133 Moreover, one of the most important advantages
conferred on corporations by state law, the power to dispose of funds
received in the course of business as corporate property subject to the
business judgment of management rather than the desires of sharehold-
ers, accounts for the ability of corporations to speak without public sup-
port. The speech effect of this advantage is to allow corporations to
engage in political advocacy without any natural person parting with her
own money. Lack of personal sponsorship, therefore, may be an impor-
tant link between the Court's discussion of state-conferred advantages
and speech without public support.
Concern for personal sponsorship has been a common element in
several of the Court's recent decisions on organizational speech. For ex-
ample, expression by individuals who must part with their money to fi-
nance speech by political action committees (PACs) moved the Court, in
NCPAC v. FEC,134 to extend first amendment protection to PAC
speech.1 31 And in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,136 the
Court held that a prohibition like the one upheld in Austin 137 cannot be
applied to a nonprofit corporation formed to promote the shared political
agenda of its members. Treating the facts of Massachusetts Citizens for
Life as a set of conditions limiting first amendment protection for incor-
porated advocacy organizations, the Austin Court explained that states
cannot prohibit campaign expenditures by corporations that (1) are
formed exclusively for political purposes, (2) impose no financial or other
disincentive for withdrawal from membership on account of disagree-
ment with the corporation's expression, and (3) are sufficiently independ-
ent from business corporations to preclude their use as a conduit for
political expenditures of corporate treasury funds.1 38
133. See Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 258 n. 11.
134. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
135. In NCPAC, the Court held facially unconstitutional a provision of the Presidential
Election Campaign Fund Act that imposed a ceiling on PAC expenditures in support of a
candidate who has elected to accept public financing. The Court inferred that small contribu-
tors use PACs to enhance their own voices from the fact that contributors must part with their
money to finance PAC speech. NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 494-95.
136. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
137. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-
55, prohibits corporations from using treasury funds to make "a contribution or expenditure in
connection with any [federal] election," but permits corporations to establish and administer a
separate segregated fund for political purposes. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b). In fact, the state statute in
Austin was modeled on the federal statute in Massachusetts Citizens for Life. Austin, 110 S. Ct.
1391, 1395 n.1 (1990).
138. Id. at 1399. The second requirement qualifies the Court's conclusion in Bellotti that
expenditures for corporate expression do not coerce shareholders to support the expression of
ideas they do not hold. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); see
supra note 91 and accompanying text. Shareholder support may not be coerced, but neither
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In light of these decisions, Austin could be read as limiting the Buck-
ley maxim to expression by natural persons. When the three limiting
conditions of Massachusetts Citizens for Life are satisfied, corporate
speech voices the personal views manifest in contributions, and equaliz-
ing restrictions on corporate speech therefore curtail vicarious expression
by natural persons. Massachusetts Citizens for Life shows that the Buck-
ley maxim fully applies to expression by natural persons, even if they
would speak through a corporation. When the limiting conditions of
Massachusetts Citizens for Life are not satisfied, however, there is no as-
surance that corporate speech gives voice to personal views. Austin per-
mits states to restrict this purely corporate speech if necessary to protect
public discourse and democratic processes.
139
The composition of the Austin majority lends some support to this
interpretation. All but one of the Justices voting to uphold the statute in
Austin had previously taken the position that corporations do not have
autonomy interests to protect against restrictions intended to foster pub-
lic debate. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White and Stevens, ar-
gued in a dissenting opinion in Pacific Gas that it makes no sense to
accord corporations "negative" speech rights, because the Barnette opin-
ion shows them to be grounded in concern for independence in matters of
conscience, and corporations cannot implicate that concern."4 And in a
dissenting opinion that now reads like a first draft for the new major-
may it be inferred when significant costs of withdrawal may inhibit disassociation. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765. If shareholder support cannot be inferred, the government may intervene to
prevent grossly unequal spending from distorting public discourse.
139. The Court also had to revisit the issue that had concerned Chief Justice Burger in
Bellotti: whether corporate speech .can be limited without interfering with the important role
of the press in informing the public on political issues. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring); see supra note 88 and accompanying text. The Court in Austin found that it can.
The Michigan statute exempted from its prohibition expenditures "by a broadcasting station,
newspaper, magazine, or other periodical or publication for any news story, commentary, or
editorial... in the regular course of publication or broadcasting." MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 169.206(3)(d). The Court approved of this exemption despite the claim that it denies corpo-
rations engaged in other businesses equal protection of the laws.
Departing from its treatment of the issue in Bellotti, theAustin Court described the role of
the institutional press in providing information, criticism, and a forum for debate as "unique"
and therefore an appropriate basis for distinct treatment. Austin 110 S. Ct. at 1402. Applica-
tion of the prohibition against independent expenditures to the press might interfere with per-
formance of its "crucial societal role" of reporting and editorializing on newsworthy events.
Id. Therefore, "[a]lthough the press' unique societal role may not entitle the press to greater
protection under the Constitution, it does provide a compelling reason for the State to exempt
media corporations from the scope of political expenditure limitations." Id. (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
140. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 32-35 (1986) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
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ity,'4 ' Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, argued in
Bellotti that corporate speech does not further self-expression, self-reali-
zation, or self-fulfillment because communications by business corpora-
tions do not manifest individual freedom of choice.142 Thus, five
members of the Austin majority had already concluded that no corporate
interest in speech autonomy can overcome a statute intended to protect
the public interest in rich debate.
IV. Autonomy, Debate, and Corporate Speech
Austin marks an important turning point in the Court's treatment of
corporate speech and, more generally, of conflicts between the first
amendment ideals of speaker autonomy and rich public debate. Revers-
ing the treatment suggested by Bellotti and Pacific Gas, the decision in
Austin accorded public debate greater importance than the autonomy of
corporate speakers. The Court did not, however, discuss this normative
balance or articulate reasons supporting it, an omission that leaves future
application uncertain. If not explained and consistently applied, Austin's
treatment of Bellotti may come to stand for nothing more than the re-
fusal of dissenting Justices to acquiesce in the decisions of an unstable
Court.
The Court could reconcile the two decisions by holding Bellotti ap-
plicable only to referenda and Austin applicable only to candidate elec-
tion campaigns. 14 3 It would be difficult to defend that reconciliation on
the grounds of principle, though. Only Justice Brennan's concurring
opinion in Austin suggested it, and in response to an argument based on
underinclusiveness of the Michigan statute in permitting independent
corporate expenditures for advocacy other than in candidate elections."4
The prohibition did not reach farther, according to Justice Brennan, first
because advocacy concerning candidate elections lies at the heart of
political debate, and second because Bellotti and Consolidated Edison
prohibit such restrictions in other areas.1
41
The first of these reasons suggests that the second should be modi-
fied. Campaign advocacy is central to the democratic process, as Justice
Brennan recognized; but advocacy supporting the election of a candidate
is no more central to democracy than advocacy related to a referendum
141. On concern that corporate speech does not reflect public support, compare Bellotti,
435 U.S. at 809-12 (White, J., dissenting), with Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1391 (1990).
142. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 804-05 (White, J., dissenting).
143. See id. at 788 n.26 (reserving question); FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., 459
U.S. 197, 210 n.7 (1982) (suggesting limitation of Bellotti).
144. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1392 (Brennan, J., concurring opinion).
145. Id.
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issue to be decided directly by the people. If preventing "corruption" of
the democratic process through distortion of public debate is a suffi-
ciently compelling governmental interest to justify restriction of corpo-
rate speech in candidate elections, it should justify a similar restriction in
referendum campaigns as well. 146
Thus, rather than attempting to reconcile Austin with Belotti, the
task is now to recognize and evaluate the normative shift that has taken
place. This section evaluates the new balance struck in Austin by exam-
ining how corporate speech implicates the ideals of autonomy and de-
bate. It defends the seemingly paradoxical conclusions that corporate
speech can at least sometimes enrich public debate, in part because cor-
porate speech is not always reducible to the speech of individual corpo-
rate constituents, and that corporate speech does not implicate the ideal
of speaker autonomy because decisions concerning whether to speak and
what to say are always controlled by corporate constituents and not the
corporation itself.
A. Corporate Speech and Public Debate
Public debate will exist with or without corporate speech. The is-
sue, therefore, is how corporate speech affects the discourse that would
exist in its absence. Whether that discourse is enriched or impoverished
by corporate speech depends primarily on the distinctiveness of what
corporations have to say and the ability of the public to receive corporate
views without being deprived of the views of others. If corporations sim-
ply amplify voices of the people who run them, and give their voices such
volume that people in less privileged positions cannot fairly compete,147
the ideal of rich public debate would not support protection of corporate
speech. If corporations express a viewpoint that differs from what corpo-
rate managers hold or would be personally motivated to express, how-
ever, public discourse could be enriched by its addition and the ideal of
rich public debate would support protection.
146. See Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 622-25
(1982) (potential for spending to distort political process especially great in referendum and
initiative campaigns).
147. Most of the literature on corporate speech defends variations of this claim. O'Kelley,
The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the
Corporation After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1351 (1979); Friedman
and May, Corporate Rights to Free Speech, 5 Bus. & PROF. ETHICS J. 5, 9 (1988); Baker,
Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish's "The Value of Free
Speech," 130 U. PA. L. REv. 646, 663 (1982); see also Note, Constitutional Rights of the
Corporate Person, 91 YALE L.J. 1641, 1655 (1982).
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Some have argued that it is theoretically impossible for corporate
speech to be anything other or anything more than speech by persons
who authorize corporate expenditures.148 That view seems mistaken,
though, because there is reason to believe that corporate speech can and
sometimes does add an otherwise unheard view to public discourse. This
follows in part from the complexity of organizational decision making.
Views expressed on behalf of a large corporation may reflect participa-
tion by many people because the information needed to make decisions
for a large corporation is not always possessed by any single individ-
ual.149 Each participant in the process of formulating a corporate posi-
tion, from the chair of the board and top corporate executive to low-level
research functionaries, may subtly influence that position simply by in-
terpreting the information she contributes. At the same time, each par-
ticipant's personal views may be influenced by information contributed
by others. Thus, even if corporate speech ultimately coincides with the
personal views of corporate managers, it may be that their views were
altered by the process of formulating an official position for the corpora-
tion to express.
Moreover, it seems implausible that the views expressed on behalf of
corporations always coincide with the personal views of top managers.
In addition to participation by many people, a corporation's public state-
ments may reflect bargaining among a multiplicity of constituent groups
that share a common goal in realizing profit but whose motivations and
interests diverge and conflict in many other respects. 150 Even limiting
the corporate constituency to shareholders and management, each of
which may include competing factions, leaves a broad range of divergent
interests. In addition, the corporation's public statements may be influ-
enced by loyalty to employees or the power of unions representing them,
by the perceived needs and attitudes of customers, by pressures exerted
by creditors and investment bankers, and by the imperative of avoiding
undue offense to legislators and regulators.
148. This claim has been based variously on assertions: (1) that expression is a physical act
that can only be performed by people and not by corporations themselves, O'Kelley, supra
note 147, at 1351; (2) that the entire status of a corporation is ontologically derivative,
Freidman & May, supra note 147, at 9; see also May, Vicarious Agency, 43 PHIL. STUD. 69
(1983), P. WERHANE, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND CORPORATIONS 50 (1985); and (3) that speech
not directly related to a corporation's business or assets must "by definition" reflect individual,
not corporate views, Freidman & May, supra note 147, at 15.
149. M. DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 32 (1986).
150. M. DAN-COHEN, supra note 149, at 18-21; Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the
Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 41-43 (E. Mason ed. 1959); J.
THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION 127-28, 138-39 (1967).
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Formal decision-making structures and basic policies entrenched in
constitutive documents or prior corporate decisions also constrain the
ability of top managers to make the corporation express their personal
views.151 Melded through these structures and policies, the disparate in-
terests and purposes of various constituencies may give rise to an organi-
zational view.152 And once this corporate position emerges, fiduciary
duty could require corporate agents to express views on behalf of the
corporation that conflict with their own views or that they would simply
lack sufficient motivation to express on their own behalf.15
In addition to the effects these constraints have on the messages pro-
duced by corporations, corporate voice can also influence the way
messages are received by the public. Owing in part to our assumptions
about what motivates the organizational decision making of a business
enterprise, a call to stop or avoid war takes on a somewhat different con-
tent depending on whether it is presented as the official view of a well-
known corporation or as the personal view of one of its executives, whose
name would not command similar recognition. Similarly, in Austin, the
prestige and presumed business expertise of the Michigan Chamber of
Commerce might have influenced how readers would react to predictions
of the economic effects of a candidate's election. Because context alters
content, the speaker, no less than the medium, is part of the message.
Undoubtedly, corporate speech sometimes does serve only to am-
plify the views of one or several dominant individuals in corporate man-
agement.1 54 But in many other cases, the melding of diverse constituent
interests, the integration of information from diffuse sources, the media-
tion of decision-making structures, the motivating effect of fiduciary du-
ties, and the addition identifiable sponsorship makes to content probably
result in the expression of views that would not be heard if business cor-
porations were excluded from public discourse. This alone supports
some protection for corporate speech under the first amendment ideal of
rich public debate.
151. Drawing upon positivist jurisprudence, Peter French stresses the importance of deci-
sion structures and long-term basic corporate policies as "rules of recognition" that determine
which actions of individual constituents are attributable to the corporation itself. P. FRENCH,
COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 43 (1984).
152. P. FRENCH, supra note 151, at 45-46; M. DAN-COHEN, supra note 149, at 34-36; see
also J. COLEMAN, Foundations of Social Theory 540 (1990).
153. See M. DAN-COHEN, supra note 149, at 107-08; J. COLEMAN, supra note 152, at 554-
56. The existence of fiduciary duties has important ramifications for the ideal of speaker au-
tonomy as well. See infra pp. 201-04.
154. In addition to the scholars cited supra note 148, Justice White took the stronger posi-
tion that corporate speech always does so in his dissenting opinion in Bellotti. First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 805-07 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
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Corporate speech can also enrich public debate, however, even when
it simply amplifies views held by corporate constituents, by adding to the
limited range of views given widespread dissemination. Few individuals
can devote sufficient personal resources to compete with government and
the institutional press for public attention. Perhaps, as others have ar-
gued, the people who authorize corporate political expenditures have
substantial personal resources that could be used to make their views
known if the corporations they manage did not provide an outlet. I55 It
seems unlikely, though, that every corporation that employs mass media
to disseminate its views acts at the behest of an individual who is wealthy
enough to do the same on her own account and would also be motivated
to do so. 1 56 Thus, although increased spending by wealthy corporate
managers might partly offset restrictions on corporate speech, it cannot
be expected to do so fully.
Accordingly, corporate speech may enrich public debate simply by
reducing the dominance of media corporations, whose control is concen-
trated in relatively few hands,1 57 and of government officials, who enjoy
virtually unfettered access to the press and free use of a variety of public
mechanisms for disseminating their views. 15 If most individuals cannot
(and most who can, do not) effectively compete in a market dominated
by the great institutions of press and government, competition among
three loud voices will provide a more diverse discourse than a debate
dominated by two, so long as the third does not merely echo the
155. See Friedman & May, supra note 147, at 15 (arguing that virtually all corporate
speech would be replaced by identical speech by individual managers); cf Baker, supra note
147, at 663 (1982).
156. Consider, for example, whether Mobil's managers would personally spend $3.5 mil-
lion a year on political advertising, as the corporation does. T. EDSALL, supra note 1, at 116.
In any event, the proposition that identical speech by individual managers would replace all
corporate speech is a self-defeating argument for restrictions because, under that assumption,
public debate would be distorted in precisely the same way by wealthy individuals if not by
corporations.
157. See B. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY ix, 4, 20-25 (2d ed. 1987) (twenty-nine
corporations control most of the business in daily newspapers, magazines, televisions, books,
and motion pictures, and trend is toward even greater concentration); STERLING & HAIGHT,
THE MASS MEDIA: ASPEN INSTITUTE GUIDE TO COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY TRENDS 65-
72 (1978). The fact that every member of society is geographically situated aggravates the
effect of media concentration, as Benno Schmidt graphically explains. B. SCHMIDT, supra note
69, at 45.
158. See Gurevitch & Blumler, Political Communication Systems and Democratic Values,
in DEMOCRACY AND THE MASS MEDIA 277-78 (J. Lichtenberg ed. 1990); M. YUDOF, WHEN
GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 6-9 (1983); Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565
(1980); Emerson & Haber, The Scopes Case in Modern Dress, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 522, 526-27
(1960).
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159
I do not mean to argue that corporate speech substantially broadens
the range of issues and proposals discussed in public or considered in
politics. On the contrary, whatever measure of diversity that corpora-
tions might add to the discussion of issues placed on the agenda by
others, business corporations tend to confine the agenda by associating
private enterprise with political democracy and thus reinforce the notion
that grand issues of political and economic organization are not subject
to serious reconsideration." Removing speakers from the debate, how-
ever, is a poor strategy for broadening political agendas.
Such broadening can be accomplished, if at all, only by adding new
speakers, 161 in part because corporate speech does to some extent echo
the other loud voices in public discourse. On many issues, business cor-
porations' viewpoints would be heard and sometimes expressed by gov-
ernment officials even if corporations were forbidden to make public
statements, because the people who manage large corporations tend to be
influential political constituents. 162 In addition, media organizations are
usually business corporations and therefore share some of their core in-
terests, like the sanctity of property and the basics of free enterprise. Of
course, separation of media ownership and management leaves some
room for independent editorial judgment. Nevertheless, editors are
bound to know of, and be sensitive to, business concerns of the organiza-
tions in which they operate; and they at least occasionally bow to the
direct and indirect pressures exerted by corporate owners and
advertisers. 163
Nevertheless, while government and media institutions tend to share
business corporations' concern for the basics of free enterprise, some
room for divergence of views obviously remains. If government officials
always bowed to business concerns, statutes restricting corporate speech
would not be enacted. In addition, corporate ownership of media organi-
159. Cf M. YUDOF, supra note 158, at 90-110, 161-64 (powerful competitors help prevent
government speech from corrupting democracy).
160. C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 204-07 (1977).
161. Pacific Gas may therefore have a more important effect on public debate than either
Bellotti or Austin. Unfortunately, Pacific Gas is not the only recent decision in which the
Supreme Court has failed to protect participation in public discourse by the relatively unaf-
fluent. See also, e.g., City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (upholding
ordinance that forbade posting of signs on public property); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Law-
yers Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990) (approving per se condemnation of protest boycott under
antitrust laws).
162. See C. LINDBLOM, supra note 160, at 170-200.
163. Examples are reported in B. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 157, at 27-45. See also Gurevitch
& Blumler, supra note 158, at 272, 275-76.
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zations and occasional business interference with editorial judgments
cannot establish that press institutions typically recite only the views
dictated by big business. Everyday experience defies that over-
generalization.
The existence of distinct corporate views and the ability of corpora-
tions to compete with government and press for public attention support
the conclusion that corporate speech can enrich public debate and there-
fore should at least sometimes be protected under the First Amendment.
The existence of corporate voice and the desirability of a corporate com-
petition with government and media cannot establish that corporate
speech will always enrich public debate, regardless of circumstances,
however. In particular, these desirable aspects of corporate speech do
not refute either the state's claim in Bellotti that corporations drown out
lesser voices or the Austin majority's conclusion that corporate wealth
threatens thereby to distort the democratic process.
In examining these claims, it is important to avoid Meiklejohn's
misleading paradigm of a shouting match in a small town meeting, where
contending positions may be considered by all through simple applica-
tion of Roberts Rules of Order.1 Public debate in our mass society is
nothing like that and, more importantly, can never be governed as if it
were. For instance, it is impossible for a corporation or any other
speaker to increase the volume of its advocacy enough to prevent a
reader of this Article from hearing its message; that depends entirely on
its author. On the other hand, no rules of order could possibly give this
Article equal time to persuade Mobil's audience, for most of the people
who read Mobil's editorial advertisements will never know this Article
exists, much less consider the arguments presented here.
The town meeting paradigm obscures the fact that American de-
mocracy is conducted by citizens who deliberate in the midst of many
debates, simultaneously conducted on all different subjects. No one can
pay careful attention to all of those debates, or review everything said
and written about even a few of them. Even the most active citizen can
only view or hear a tiny fraction of the information and advocacy made
available each day, and therefore must choose--even if unthinkingly-
among the alternatives.
Once we begin to consider speech from this perspective, the familiar
metaphor of drowning out begs the question it is supposed to answer:
How could speech by one class of advocates interfere with communica-
tion by others, or have a disproportionate effect on ballot results, if audi-
164. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 26, at 22-27.
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ences choose to receive what they do and can usually read or listen to
what they choose without interference? As an answer to first amendment
objections, any answer to this question must be compatible with the
existence of some vision of a functioning democracy, a requirement Jus-
tices Scalia and Kennedy accused the Austin majority of failing to meet.
That accusation has some force, if only because the Austin majority
did not explain its theory of political distortion. While one can easily
imagine that the extent of a corporation's advocacy might exceed public
support for the ideas it expresses, it is not so readily apparent how a
corporation's advocacy could exert an influence on elections that exceeds
public support for its ideas.165 If democracy is to have meaning, we must
generally assume that speech affects voting behavior only when it per-
suades; and neither democratic theory nor first amendment doctrine will
bear the proposition that the political process is "distorted" when cam-
paign advocacy persuades people to vote for a political candidate.166 As
the Court observed in Bellotti, "[t]he fact that advocacy may persuade
the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it."167
One overlooked circumstance answers this objection and explains
how one speaker could drown out the voice of another in a society whose
members choose what to hear: the choice generally cannot be made on
account of the relative persuasiveness, reliability, or any other favorable
attribute of available messages. Choosing on the basis of content would
require some knowledge of the content of all available messages-knowl-
edge whose unattainability is the very reason choices must be made.1 6
Instead, we choose much of the information and advocacy that shapes
our views on the basis of the medium-source that carries it, i.e., whether
165. By finding that independent expenditures do not threaten quid pro quo corruption,
the Court rejected the equation of speech with corrupting influence in Buckley. See Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976).
166. See B. Holden, Liberal Democracy and the Social Determination of Ideas, in NOMOs
XXV: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1983); cf Tushnet, Talking to Each Other, 1984 Wis. L. REV.
129 (noting that determinist conclusions are incompatible with the most basic premises of first
amendment theory). As one would expect, empirical research supports the proposition that
campaign spending influences election results. See, e.g., Mastro, Costlow, & Sanchez, Taking
the Initiative: Corporate Control of the Referendum Process Through Media Spending and
What to Do About It, 32 FED. COMM. L.J. 315, 320-27 (1980); Wright, supra note 146, at 622.
The relationship between spending and results is too complex, however, to support simple
determinist conclusions. Seeeg., Grier, Campaign Spending and Senate Elections, 1978-84, 63
PUB. CHOICE 201 (1989); Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent
Experience, Public Choice Theory, and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REv. 505 (1982).
167. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, at 790 (1978).
168. This "fundamental paradox" led Kenneth Arrow to question whether efficient mar-
kets for information are possible, since potential buyers must base their decisions on "less than
optimal criteria." ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 151-52 (1971).
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it appears newspapers, magazines, or broadcast programs we read,
watch, or listen to for reasons that seldom have anything to do with the
content of editorial advertisements. As a result of these choices, some
media reach vastly larger parts of the electorate than others, and these
tend to be the most expensive for editorial and other advertisers.
By allowing access to media that less affluent competitors lack,
wealth gives some advocates exposure to more voters and thereby gives
them an opportunity to persuade a larger part of the electorate. Given
sufficiently disproportionate access to audiences, the views of a wealthy
advocate might have a greater influence on voting behavior than compet-
ing views that would persuade every citizen that considered both. 169 In
this way, even in a society of selective audiences and rational voters, con-
centrated wealth could allow less persuasive speech to dilute the propor-
tionate mass effect of more persuasive speech.
This does not fully capture the metaphor of drowning out, however,
because it fails to explain how speech by one advocate could interfere
with communication by another. There are at least two ways in which
concentrated wealth might enable corporate speech to reduce the audi-
ence reached by less affluent advocates. First, a high level of annual con-
sumption of space and time by corporate political editorials might
influence advertising prices and thereby make access to media that reach
the largest audiences unaffordable for less affluent advocates. Second,
even assuming such displacement does not take place, corporate political
advertising could reduce the number of people reached by other advo-
cates as a result of selective reception of messages carried by a single
medium.
Suppose, for example, that I can afford to purchase a sixteenth of a
page of the local daily paper, or that my persuasiveness convinces the
editors of the New York Times and several other newspapers to run my
letter free of charge. Many people who receive those papers do not read
them cover to cover. Their time is limited, and they probably devote
some of it to broadcast programs and other media. When people receive
more information than they can process, they process what they can and
ignore the rest.170 Once again, their choice of what to ignore cannot al-
ways be based on its content. By attracting readers' attention and occu-
pying their limited time, a competing advocate increases the likelihood
that my views will be among the material readers will ignore. Thus, a
competitor may reduce the number of people who will read my views
169. See sources cited infra note 166.
170. Jacoby, Perspectives on Information Overload, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 432, 434-35
(1984).
576 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 18:541
even without increasing my cost of access to mass media, and its ability
to do so depends in part on the amount of space or time each of us can
afford to display or repeat our messages.
This is not just a complaint about the existence of competition in the
marketplace of ideas. Instead, it shows that competition in the market-
place of ideas is not just a competition of ideas but also a competition for
attention, in which material resources can provide a dispositive advan-
tage. This result requires refinement of the conclusion reached earlier,
that the public debate ideal at least sometimes supports protection of cor-
porate speech. The potential for corporations to express a distinctive
point of view and to reduce the dominance of government and media in
public discourse are not the only effects corporate speech can have on
public debate. Because material resources may give corporations a dis-
positive advantage in competing for the attention of a public audience,
concentrated wealth may enable corporations to reduce the likelihood
that individual voices will be heard, however persuasive they may be.
While corporate speech has the potential to enrich public debate, it also
has the potential to impoverish public debate instead.
Whether corporate speech will enrich or impoverish public debate is
an empirical question that usually cannot be answered without consider-
ation of surrounding circumstances. The central empirical issues are
whether the voices of government and media already drown out individ-
ual speech and therefore have no effective competitor, in which case cor-
porate speech could make a particularly valuable contribution to public
debate, and the extent to which the addition of corporate speech makes it
even more difficult for individuals to be heard, in which case corporate
speech has an adverse effect on public debate. Where corporate speech
simultaneously does both, the empirical issues are especially difficult, be-
cause consideration of the net effect is necessary.
The answers to these empirical questions are likely to vary with the
circumstances of public discourse in different communities and at differ-
ent times. Individuals may have a more significant voice in debate on
local issues than on national ones, or a greater opportunity to influence
public affairs in some states than in others. In some states, past experi-
ence may show that corporations can and do use concentrated wealth to
gain advantage in competition with individuals for audience attention; in
other states, this experience may be foreign.
These variables call for situation-specific analysis. Because corpo-
rate speech can enrich public debate under some circumstances, restric-
tions should not be upheld on the basis of a contrary presumption. Thus,
the Bellotti Court was rightly skeptical of the claim that corporate speech
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impoverishes public debate, asserted by Massachusetts without the sup-
port of record evidence or legislative findings. 7 ' It would be equally
wrong, however, for the Court to presume that corporate speech enriches
public debate in all circumstances. Where record evidence or legislative
findings support the conclusion that corporate wealth threatens to drown
out the speech of individuals, the first amendment ideal of rich debate
supports restrictions, particularly those that leave some outlet for corpo-
rate points of view, as did the segregated fund exception to the prohibi-
tion in Austin. 
1 72
While restrictions on corporate speech affect public debate in multi-
ple ways, regulations like the one in Pacific Gas that require corporations
to distribute communications by others are not as empirically complex.
Because the order granting TURN access to the utility's billing envelopes
did not preclude the utility from disseminating its own views as well, a
decision to uphold the order would not have removed the corporate
viewpoint from public discourse. By contrast, the Court's decision inval-
idating the access order made it more likely that corporate views would
dominate public discourse on regulatory policies actually reaching people
affected by them.1 73 Thus, the Court's decision in Pacific Gas frustrated
the public debate ideal more than the Commission's access order could
have.
B. Corporate Speech and Speaker Autonomy
Considerations of autonomy may be dispositive when a restriction
on corporate speech will foster public debate, or when subjecting corpo-
rate property like billing envelopes to expressive use will allow others to
171. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text. This Article will not attempt to docu-
ment the extent to which corporations actually do drown out competing voices. Its purpose is
to examine the constitutional issues restrictions raise and to identify empirical issues that are
situation-specific. Several interesting factual accounts are already available. E.g., Conlon,
The Declining Role of Individual Contributors in Financing Congressional Campaigns, 3 J. L. &
POL. 467, 467-80 (1987); T. EDSALL, supra note 1; Wright, supra note 146, at 614-25.
172. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. By saying this, I do not mean to approve
of the result in Austin. The Court's opinion cites neither record evidence nor legislative find-
ings to support the conclusion that corporate speech actually threatened to dominate or distort
public debate. If the evidentiary and legislative record contain no such support, the Court's
decision could only be based on a presumption inconsistent with the proposition that corporate
speech can enrich public discourse - a proposition I have found plausible and the very reason
that the Court required the state to offer a justification for its prohibition.
173. It seems safe to assume that space in utility billing envelopes covered by surplus post-
age was the most efficient vehicle for distributing messages to people affected by decisions of
the Public Utility Commission. The Court's decision left the utility with free use of that vehi-
cle and left TURN, which was funded by contributions, to depend on alternatives that were
certain to be more costly and more likely to miss some consumers.
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participate in public debate. Bellotti implies that the Buckley maxim,
that the speech of some elements of society cannot be restricted to en-
hance the relative voice of others, precludes restrictions on corporate
speech even if the restrictions would enrich public debate. 174 The Court,
however, appears to have retrenched from that stance in Austin.
175
Whether the Buckley maxim applies to corporations could have been dis-
positive in Pacific Gas, but only Justice Rehnquist addressed the issue in
a dissenting opinion.
176
One odd aspect of the Buckley Court's reasoning is its circularity:
the concept of restricting some voices to let others be heard is "wholly
foreign" to the First Amendment because the Court made it so in Buck-
ley. It may well be, as the Court observed, that the Framers did not
anticipate what would be required to ensure the richness of the debate, or
that this could justify some restrictions on expression. 177 In the late
eighteenth century, however, competitive imbalances did not greatly in-
terfere with the ability of individuals to influence public affairs.178 More-
over, the notion that business corporations could invoke the First
Amendment would probably have been quite a novelty itself because at
the time, the legitimacy of every corporate activity was thought to rest
entirely in a concession of the sovereign. 179 For these reasons, the Fram-
ers' intent tells us very little about whether a restriction of corporate
speech can be justified as allowing others to be heard.
180
174. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.765, 790-91 (1978).
175. See supra notes 122-33.
176. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S.1, 34-35 (1986) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (corporations lack interest in independent conscience).
177. See Emerson, Colonial Intentions and Current Realities of the First Amendment, 125
U. PA. L. REV. 737 (1977).
178. See generally Special Project, Media and the First Amendment in a Free Society, 60
GEO. L.L 867, 879 & n.33 (1972). "When the Constitution was adopted.., the individual
could make his opinions known by giving a speech on Sunday outside the local church or by
getting a printer to put up a broadside and by posting it in taverns and in other public gather-
ing spots around town. With relative ease he could have an impact .... " BAKER & BALL,
VIOLENCE AND THE MEDIA, STAFF REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 3, 68 (1969) (quoted in B. SCHMIDT, supra note 69,
at 38-39).
179. J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 1780-1970, 15-17 (1970); Chayes, supra note 150, at 34-35.
180. As applied to the First Amendment, the Framers' intent is notoriously uninformative.
See Bork, supra note 26, at 22. Taken as a whole, the Supreme Court's free speech decisions
bear little relation to the original understanding, which, to the extent it existed, was exceed-
ingly narrow. Richards, Toleration and Free Speech, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323, 330-31
(1988). See generally L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960). Thus, from an interpretivist
point of view, every aspect of Buckley--even the recognition that campaign contributions and
expenditures raise constitutional issues-was probably foreign to the First Amendment. M.
PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 63-64 (1982).
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For purposes of this analysis, we can assume that the Buckley
maxim operates as a safeguard of speech autonomy, not public debate.
The maxim could also be viewed as protecting public debate, as the opin-
ion in Buckley originally explained it;... but the subsequent corporate
speech decisions have applied the maxim either in lieu of considering the
net effects corporate speech has on public debate 82 or as an alternative
ground for striking down restrictions. 183  More importantly, corporate
speech that enriches public debate should be protected for that reason
alone, as part IV.A explains.184 Therefore, all that remains is to consider
whether the Buckley maxim should forbid the government to restrict cor-
porate speech that adversely affects public debate. In those cases, the
maxim can only be justified on the grounds of speaker autonomy, if at all.
As explained above, corporate speech can reflect a viewpoint that
differs from the views of individual managers.185 This may seem to imply
the existence of a corporate autonomy interest in speaking: if corpora-
tions possessed beliefs of their own and distinct corporate intentions un-
derlay speech acts carried out on their behalf, we might be compelled to
conclude that corporations have autonomy of a kind the First Amend-
ment should protect. 186 We are not compelled to that conclusion, how-
181. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text discussing Justice Marshall's concur-
rence in Pacific Gas.
183. See supra text notes 82-93 and accompanying text discussing Belotti.
184. See supra notes 147-73 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
186. "[lt is not that something is natural or living (in a biological sense) that stimulates
our convictions about rights or considerations [but rather the] possession of certain kinds of
capacities .... " P. FRENCH, supra note 151, at 85; cf B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE
LIBERAL STATE 69-88 (1980). In the last decade's debate over the moral status of organiza-
tions, several philosophers have observed that if corporations can be held responsible for their
actions, they must be entitled to the rights of moral agents as well, including speech rights.
Typically, the claim has been made with disturbing effect by those who reach the opposite
conclusion. E.g., T. Donaldson, MoralAgency and Corporations, 10 PHIL. IN CONTEXT 54, 54
(1980); Wolf, The Legal and Moral Responsibility of Organizations, in NoMos XXVII: CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE 267, 271 (1985). Peter French, however, has made a sustained argument that
corporations are moral agents-burdened with responsibilities and entitled to rights-because
their actions are attributable to distinct corporate intentions, beliefs, and desires. P. FRENCH,
supra note 151, at 41-46; see also French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q.
210 (1979). French bases his argument on the independence of "corporate-policy recognitors;"
that is, the basic policies entrenched in past decisions, certificates of incorporation, annual
reports, and the like, whose satisfaction determines whether the decisions and actions of corpo-
rate constituents are decisions and actions of the corporation itself. Because these recognitors
exist independently of the desires of individual constituents and persist notwithstanding con-
stituents' transience, French concludes that corporate actions can properly be described as
having been done for corporate reasons and, consequently, "as having been caused by a corpo-
rate desire coupled with a corporate belief and so ... as corporate intentional." P. FRENCH,
supra note 151, at 44.
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ever, because corporate beliefs and intentions do not exist. While we
sometimes find it useful to describe corporate actions in terms that pro-
ject intentions, beliefs, and desires upon the organization, the description
does not depend on the actual existence of any mental state, any more so
than when we describe a computer chess program's play as intended to
draw out our queen.' 8 7 Like the computer, a corporation lacks the con-
sciousness needed to intend or believe anything.
188
The absence of corporate consciousness makes first amendment so-
licitude for the autonomy of corporations as speakers dubious. As ex-
plained in Part I, the ideal of speaker autonomy was founded on respect
for a certain kind of autonomy, independence in matters of conscience.
189
The Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to extend it beyond that do-
main unless press freedoms are at stake.'90
Lack of consciousness is not the only reason corporate speech can-
not implicate the autonomy ideal, though. Even if one could find consti-
tutional value in speaker autonomy beyond concern for independence in
matters of conscience, the ability to make choices of some kind without
forcing or interference by others is a central element of autonomy,191 and
corporations lack this capacity. A corporation can never choose either to
187. P. WERHANE, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 37 (1985).
188. Cf P. WERHANE, supra note 187 at 56 ("psychophysical entity" needed for inten-
tions); Wolf, supra note 186, at 279 (unified consciousness needed for feelings). The evidence
supporting French's positivist theory of corporate intentionality, supra note 186, is ambiguous
at best. We know from our own experience that even agents capable of intentional actions
manifest unintended behaviors and cause unintended consequences. Because French's positiv-
ist theory provides no basis for distinguishing the intended from the unintended without refer-
ence to the intentions of individuals, it is consistent with the conclusion that corporate actions
are not intended at all if not intended by individual constituents.
189. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943) ("right of self-
determination in matters that touch individual opinion and personal attitude"); id. at 642
(First Amendment reserves "sphere of intellect and spirit" from official control); Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking
are complementary components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind.' ")
(citing Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637).
190. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
191. Choice of some kind without forcing or interference is at the heart of autonomy as
conceived by the range of contemporary political theorists sympathetic to the ideal, from the
liberal to the libertarian. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, supra note 186, at 11; I. BERLIN, Two
Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969); D. GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREE-
MENT 349-50 (1986); R. NoziCK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 501 (1981). Of course,
without further definition, choice without forcing or interference is a thin conception of auton-
omy, perhaps too thin to be valuable in itself. But it is not necessary to consider the kinds of
choices with respect to which autonomy is valued if corporations are not capable of autono-
mous choice of any kind. The minimal conceptual element of choice without forcing or inter-
ference captures various conceptions of autonomy that corporations can never possess, yet
could be valuable and attainable by individuals, even if our ends are in some sense socially
constituted, as liberalism's communitarian critics assert. Compare, e.g., M. SANDEL, LIBER-
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speak or to refrain from speaking-managers and shareholders must al-
ways make this choice for the corporation and act out the choice they
have made on the corporation's behalf.192 Embodied and active in the
world only through the embodiments and actions of their constituent
members, 193 corporations are incapable of autonomous action of any
kind. Governmental abstinence cannot preserve the autonomy of an en-
tity that is incapable of exercising it.194
Lacking any capacity for autonomous action, corporations have no
claim to be treated with the dignity of an autonomous moral agent. Un-
like natural persons, corporations cannot sensibly be conceived of as hav-
ing intrinsic value; they are created as a means for the satisfaction of
others' desires. They remain essentially instrumental so long as others
permit them to exist.195 Thus, even if it were possible, it would be point-
less to preserve corporate autonomy unless doing so served some social
end like the enrichment of public debate.1 96
Although corporations themselves lack autonomy and intrinsic
value, the people who associate together in an incorporated organization
do not. It is necessary, therefore, to consider how their interests in au-
ALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 114 (1982) with D. GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT
349-53 (1986).
192. Even those who argue most forcefully for corporate rights concede this point. E.g.,
Pilon, Corporations and Rights: On Treating Corporate People Justly, 13 GA. L. REv. 1245,
1303, 1320 (1979).
193. Friedman & May, supra note 147, at 9; see also May, supra note 148, at 69.
194. Edwin Baker has also argued that speaker autonomy interests are not implicated by
corporate speech, but for reasons I find unpersuasive. According to Professor Baker, business
enterprises must always choose the most profit-making option available, and market mecha-
nisms therefore control the content of corporate speech. See Baker, supra note 147, at 653.
This strict determinist view fails to account for the substantial room market constraints leave
for discretion when business decisions are made. Considerations of short-term profit, which
may not point unambiguously to a single course of action, are complicated by competing con-
cerns for corporate reputation, stability, growth, diversification, increasing returns to share-
holders, and maintenance of management control. When these considerations diverge or
conflict, dictates of the market are obscured, and considerable room remains for discretion. M.
DAN-COHEN, supra note 149, at 20-21; I. HOROwrrz, DECISIONMAKING AND THE THEORY
OF THE FIRM 291-318 (1970). Discretion is at its broadest when corporations decide whether
to engage in political advocacy and, if so, which issues to engage and what positions to take on
them. C. LINDBLOM, supra note 160, at 155. Therefore, the most that can accurately be said
is that market forces restrain managers from consistently engaging in political activities ad-
verse to shareholder interests. Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 923, 996 (1984).
195. See Friedman & May, supra note 147, at 13-14; Werhane, Formal Organizations, Eco-
nomic Freedom, and Moral Agency, 14 J. VALUE INQ. 43 (1980); M. DAN-COHEN, supra note
149, at 36-38, 61-74.
196. T. DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS AND MORALITY 43-49 (1982); see also D. Thomp-
son, Criminal Responsibility in Government, in NoMos XXVII: CRIMINAL JUSTICE 214
(1985).
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tonomy might be implicated by corporate speech. Preventing people
from associating together for the purpose of expressing common views
restricts their autonomy and may impoverish public debate. 197 So long
as people can associate together for this purpose, however, it is not ap-
parent how denying their association a particular legal status, that of a
corporation, whose consequences are only incidentally related to the in-
dividuals' expressive purpose, could restrict autonomy in a way that
should be of first amendment concern. 198 Far from restricting speech-
autonomy, the absence of corporate status allows individuals to associate
and pursue their expressive goals unconstrained by corporate law. More-
over, expressive association is neither the nature nor the purpose of an
ordinary business corporation. As Austin and Massachusetts Citizens for
Life show, the exceptional case of incorporated advocacy organizations
can be accommodated without extending protection more broadly to in-
clude ordinary business corporations. 199
I do not mean to deny that a person already in a management posi-
tion in an ordinary business corporation might experience a prohibition
against corporate speech as a restriction of her autonomy, in that she is
prevented from expressing her strongly felt convictions on behalf of the
corporation.2 °° This experience follows, however, not merely from a re-
197. The Supreme Court has protected these interests in numerous cases. See NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-909 (1982); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430-31 (1963); FEC v.
NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 494-95 (1985); Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S.
290, 294-95 (1981).
198. Thus, in Massachusetts Citizensfor Life, the Court recognized that the statute allowed
the organization to engage in advocacy if it assumed an unincorporated form, see FEC v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S.238, at 252 (1986), and viewed the statute as burden-
ing "the corporation itself," not its members and contributors. Id. at 254 n.7.
199. Cf Schneider, Free Speech and Corporate Freedom: A Comment on First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 1227, 1262 (1986) (if state allows alternative
forum for associati6nal speech, the First Amendment does not require corporate speech
rights). To the extent Professor Schneider suggests the broader principle that restrictions on
speech can be excused if alternative means for expression exist, there is some support for his
view, eg., City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 811-12 (1984),
but I would not endorse it. In my view, these propositions are independently defensible: (1)
corporate speech does not significantly implicate individual interests in associational speech,
and (2) individual interests in associational speech are protected by Button and similar
decisions.
200. I focus here on management rather than shareholders because the latter are too re-
mote from individual decisions in a large business corporation and have too little personal
influence over those decisions to be likely to experience a restriction on corporate actions as a
restriction of personal autonomy. Some shareholders might feel vicariously responsible for
reprehensible acts of their corporation, just as some citizens feel vicariously responsible for
reprehensible acts of their government. The public might even associate some shareholders
with reprehensible acts of their corporation, as the public associates judicial nominees with
discriminatory policies of clubs in which they are members. It would nevertheless be a rare if
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striction on corporate speech but also from misidentification of the cor-
poration's speech as the manager's own. The existence of fiduciary duty
shows, however, that a corporation does not speak for the people who
occupy management positions, even if the corporation speaks through
them.
Both law and social expectations require that people acting on be-
half of a corporation do so in furtherance of its interests, not their
own. 20 1 This duty may sometimes permit managers to have the corpora-
tion express personal views that happen to coincide with corporate inter-
ests, but only when this can be justified without reference to personal
interests. When corporate and personal interests conflict, fiduciary duty
may require corporate managers to authorize speech on behalf of the
corporation that differs from their personal views.20 2
This is not a reflection of personal insincerity but an indication of
the distance fiduciary duty maintains between the person acting as corpo-
rate manager and the speech she authorizes on the corporation's be-
half.20 3 Even when the corporation's speech happens to coincide with
the views of the person who authorizes it, the corporation does not speak
for her. A restriction on corporate speech, therefore, cannot be reduced
to a comparable restriction on the manager's speech. In this sense, the
corporation is impermeable. 2"
In a limited sense, a prohibition against corporate speech does re-
strict the autonomy of corporate managers: like every restriction on cor-
porate activity, a prohibition against corporate speech adds detail to the
social and legal definition of the manager's role. This effect is not a re-
striction of personal autonomy in speech or conscience, however. The
not extraordinary case in which individual shareholders participated directly in formulating a
position for the corporation to take on public issues and authorizing expression of a particular
message on the corporation's behalf.
201. See generally ABA Section of Corp., Banking and Business Law, Comm. on Corp.
Laws, Corporate Directors Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1599-1600 (1978); American Law
Institute, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE: RESTATEMENT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, Part V introductory note (T.D. No. 3, April 13, 1984), Part IV Sec. 4.01
(T.D. No. 4, April 12, 1985); 3 L. ZAJDEL, FLETCHER'S CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRI-
VATE CORPORATIONS § 850 (perm. ed. 1986). On the relationship between fiduciary duty and
social norms, see Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 802-04, 829-32 (1983).
202. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
203. Cf Dan-Cohen, Law, Community, and Communication, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1654 (ex-
plaining insincerity in analogous situations through distance between role and self).
204. See M. DAN-COHEN, supra note 149, at 35. There would be an odd asymmetry in
viewing the corporation's speech as the manager's own, and any restriction on the corpora-
tion's speech as a comparable restriction on the manager's, since the "corporate veil" protects
the manager from liability for the corporation's acts, and this presumably includes liability for
harms caused by the corporation's statements.
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restriction of speech autonomy follows instead from the effect of fiduci-
ary duty in distancing the manager from the corporation's speech. Be-
cause the corporation's speech is not the manager's own, a prohibition
against corporate speech should be viewed as limiting the manager's au-
tonomy of action in a manner not of first amendment concern.
Conclusion
Contradictions and unpredictability in Supreme Court decisions on
corporate speech are attributable in part to the Court's ambivalence
about whether the private interest in speaker autonomy or the public
interest in rich debate should prevail when these two free speech ideals
conflict. Until the Court resolves that normative issue,20 5 first amend-
ment decisions will remain contradictory and future decisions will re-
main unpredictable. Decisions on corporate speech need not remain so,
however, because the normative conflict in these cases is more apparent
than real. Corporate speech cannot implicate the ideal of speaker auton-
omy, and therefore warrants first amendment protection only when it is
instrumentally valuable under the ideal of rich public debate.
While corporate speech is normatively simpler than Supreme Court
decisions imply, the effects of corporate speech on public debate are more
complex than the Court has recognized. Due to this factual complexity,
the ideal of rich public debate supports protection of corporate speech in
some circumstances and restriction in others. While the possibility that
corporate speech may make a unique contribution to public discourse
supports careful scrutiny of statutory restrictions, judicial review should
not be uniformly fatal in application. Absent evidence that incumbents
sought to silence their adversaries, judicial review should respect a legis-
lative finding, based on consideration of the particular circumstances
under which public debate is conducted, that restrictions are needed to
prevent corporations from reducing the likelihood that individual voices
will be heard and that the restrictions will not simply increase the domi-
nance of government and the institutional press in public discourse.
Where adequate findings have not been made, it may be appropriate for
courts to provoke a second look by the legislature or for the courts them-
selves to consider post-enactment evidence of how corporate speech and
205. There is reason to doubt that the Court will ever resolve the issue with finality. The
Court is not just a committee of nine individuals, as Professor Shiffrin emphasizes in S. SHIF-
FRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY AND ROMANCE 3 (forthcoming), but a commit-
tee whose composition is always changing. The nine agree on the bare result of cases
infrequently, and unanimous agreement on a rationale is even rarer. Even if we could realisti-
cally expect them all to agree on normative theories underlying Court doctrine, now and for-
ever, it is not obvious that we should want them to do so.
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restrictions on corporate speech actually affect public debate. The choice
between those alternatives is less important than the conclusion that this
is not an area in which the validity of legislative judgments should ulti-
mately be determined by judicial presumptions.
Of course, abandoning outcome-determinative presumptions sacri-
fices some degree of predictability. Thus, while the proposed analysis of
restrictions on corporate speech might alleviate contradictions among de-
cisions in this area, it probably would not make many decisions any more
predictable than they are now. This reflects my own judgment that the
substantive ideal of rich public debate is more important and more cen-
tral to broader democratic ideals than the predictability of decisions in
this area.
There is one class of cases in which my analysis has substantial pre-
dictive value. Statutes or regulatory orders requiring a business corpora-
tion to assist dissemination of messages not of their choosing, like the
order in Pacific Gas & Electric, would seldom if ever be held to violate
the First Amendment. So long as regulations mandating corporate
speech avoid the use of contingent mechanisms that create incentives for
self-censorship, there is no reason to conclude that the contribution they
make to public discourse would be offset by a reduction of corporate
speech.

